

# KLOPP **V** GUARDIOLA

**A LOOK AT THEIR TACTICS AND STYLES OF PLAY**

★ ★ ★ ★ **ATTACKING** ★ ★ ★ ★



by **LUCA BERTOLINI**

# **Klopp v Guardiola Attacking**

**A look at their tactics and styles of play**

*By*

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## **Introduction: Citations**

- **Pep Guardiola**

"I'd rather my players to thank me for improving them, rather than for the titles"

"Success without playing the way you like to play means nothing to me".

"I will win and I will lose, but I will go on attacking with 10 players".

"My period in Munich was judged like a disaster because we were not able to win the Champions League. I won three leagues in a row, we won two cups from three, we arrived every time in the semi-finals and finals, but it was judged a disaster."

"I'm here because the Premier League is a huge challenge. I proved myself in Barcelona and again in Germany and now I want to prove myself here with my staff and amazing players."

"I know how hard the Premier League is; it is a tough league in which to put together lots of wins back-to-back. That is a challenge. There are many teams who can finish in first place and the competition will be fierce."

"Of course. I thought 'If it doesn't work, I'll go home, another one is coming and someone can try in his way', so in that moment there was concern about the results, what we can do to improve."

"I want each of my players to be a good teammate; this is the most important quality. I like a player who thinks about himself but also about the group and Manchester City."

"What I want most of all is after each game, and after the season ends, City supporters saying that they have enjoyed the football. That is the most important thing."

"We are all working here to make this club better. I don't like the guys to think about what the club can do for them. We are here to help Manchester City to become a better club over the upcoming years and hopefully that is what you will see."

- **Jürgen Klopp**

"80,000 people in a stadium and it's a boring game is not okay."

"The best football is always about expression of emotion. Always."

"Jürgen creates a family. We always say: 30 per cent tactic, 70 per cent teambuilding."

"It is not my sport. I don't like winning with 80% [possession]. Sorry that is not enough for me. Fighting football, not serenity football, that is what I like. What we call in German 'English' — rainy day, heavy pitch, 5-5, everybody is dirty in the face and goes home and cannot play for weeks after."

"I show my team very often Barcelona but not the way they play. Just the way they celebrate goals. Goal no 5768 in the last few weeks and they go 'Yeeees' like they never scored a goal. This is what I

love about football. That's what you have to feel all the time. Until you die. And then everything is OK."

"Counter-pressing is the best playmaker in football."

"Jürgen's philosophy is very much that we've got to run further, run faster, run quicker than every other team because if we can do that then the skill will take over."

"Energy. I'm happy when the stats say that we ran 10 km more than the opponents, in the end of the game. You could say that you have to run in the right direction. Okay, in the right direction, but 10 km better than the others. It's the first rule they give you as a child: run."

"Without being the most confident person in the world, I think I am the right person for Liverpool."

This club means everything to the people. So, it's our job to show that it means absolutely everything for us as well. It's a lot about emotion, the intensity, how the supporters live. Where did you ever hear a better message than "You'll never walk alone"? It's the most beautiful song in the world. Everybody feels it, everybody loves it. Everybody gets the message. In your darkest moments, you are not alone. I love that. We are Liverpool and that means we have to entertain the people. We have to show all the desire, all the love for the game. We will all be together soon. There will be a moment for us. For now, tell the world: we are Liverpool... Champions of England.

## What players say about them?

- **About Pep Guardiola:**

“Guardiola wants to make football better, to take his team to another level. [ . . . ] He played in the third team back then (when he was given his first-team debut at Barcelona in 1990), and physically he was nothing, but he knew how to help himself with the right movement. And this experience in turning disadvantages into advantages distinguishes him as a coach. To me, he’s one of the best in the world. What is really outstanding about Guardiola is that he doesn’t force his style of football onto his team. He analyses what is best for the team, utilizes the special details and through that leads them to the greatest possible success. It’s no coincidence that Spain won the 2010 World Cup with seven of Guardiola’s players, and now Germany with six or seven of his players.”

**(Johan Cruyff)**

“Pep never stops thinking. I will give you an example. We beat Dortmund 3-0 last month. We were on the plane, very happy as we’d beaten our biggest rival, but he sat at the front, opened his laptop and started preparing for the next match. He is obsessed with football.”

**(Karl-Heinz Rummenigge)**

“If Pep told me to throw myself off the second tier at the Camp Nou, I’d think: ‘There must be something good down there.’”

**(Dani Alves)**

“He doesn’t give himself a minute’s rest. He’s pig-headed, football is his everything and he puts so much intensity into everything. Pep’s almost got a sickness for football.”

**(Xavi)**

“Pep doesn’t just give you orders, he also explains why. That makes you a better footballer because you learn the reasoning behind his instructions.”

**(Gerard Pique)**

“There is one thing you can be sure of — he wants to dominate. People associate his teams with the number of goals they score but his teams also don’t concede a lot. He always wants to be on the front foot, having the ball, possession, and he wants to dominate.”

**(Thierry Henry)**

“He gives you so many solutions for when you are then in the middle of a game, and nearly all of them turn out to be the right solutions when you apply them.”

**(Andres Iniesta)**

“He is an incredible coach on a completely different level in terms of tactics,” he said. “He’s a brilliant coach and I’m sure he’ll do a great job [at City]. “He really helps players develop and he even helped me improve at the age of 30. With Pep it’s more than just about winning trophies. You’re always measured by the number of trophies but he developed a lot of players with the way he thinks about tactics, the way he analyses games and prepares teams for particular opponents.”

**(Phillip Lahm)**

“I had to learn a few things in the first couple of months but Pep was able to see he could get the best out of me to help the team. I’m in my second year with him, I’ve learned a lot and working with him has been just what I needed. Pep looks at everything we need to do. I watched what I ate and I trained at home. I know the little things are important too. Pep thinks about football 24 hours a day. He covers every angle to the smallest detail and he always demands 100 per cent in training and in games.”

**(Robert Lewandowski)**

“I have learned a lot from Pep. He’s a genius. I can learn more from him in an hour than from others in one year. He not only lifts you to the next level on the pitch, but also in your mind. He has revealed totally new options to me. I did not know that was possible when I got to Munich. He found a new position for me.”

**(Douglas Costa)**

“He’s the world’s best in terms of analyzing the opposition, game preparation and coming up with solutions.”

**(Toni Kroos)**

“Pep brought greater emphasis on putting value on possession and controlling the game. “The Bundesliga has always been a competition of strength, power and goals. He changed the concept of German football in general and they found a harmony that saw them go on to become world champions.”

**(Thiago Alcantara)**

“He is more like a genius who reads the game and covers every situation imaginable. He is always showing us how to create space and find solutions and there is no manager like him, which makes him probably the best in the world.”

**(Ilkay Gundogan)**

- **About Jürgen Klopp**

“He is a bit of a funny guy, but at the same time, he is a serious guy. Usually when I am talking to him off the pitch it is about personal things. Things about lifestyle and life – and that is important to me. I think I have somebody I can confide in.”

**(Sadio Mané)**

“I think I improved a lot in every way: physically, tactically, mentally, I learned a bit of every aspect.” [...] “I am never tired of praising Klopp. He has so many good things on and off the pitch. He really helps us on a daily basis, we learn so much from him in every way.”

**(Roberto Firmino)**

“I came to Dortmund from a relatively small team and I struggled during my first six months to find my place there. I was a bit shy and, to be honest, I wasn’t brave enough to do certain things. But thanks to the help of my team-mates, and with the help of Jürgen and his staff, too, I managed to improve.”

**(Ilkay Gundogan)**



“I have a very similar connection with Jurgen Klopp at Liverpool as I had earlier with Ronald Koeman at Southampton. Like Koeman, Klopp knows exactly how to get the best out of me – by being critical. [...] “When the media are hyping me and being very positive, he will downplay the praise and all that often with a wink. And when I was voted UEFA Player of the Year and had to go to the ceremony, Jurgen told all the lads that I was picking up the trophy on behalf of the entire team.” [...] “All the boys in the squad know I can take that sort of stuff very well. I know what he means. At the same time, the boss gives me a lot of respect and responsibility.”

**(Virgil van Dijk)**

“I was not used to defending from the front. I didn’t even know that it was a two-way game. Jurgen taught me modern football.”

**(Ivan Perisic)**

“I am thankful to Klopp. He worked on my personality and the psychological part. Klopp showed me the way. He supported me and told me I had to keep my head up because good things were coming.”

**(Henrikh Mkhitaryan)**

“He taught me how to have a strong personality and how to improve my level. I have a lot of respect for this man.”

**(Pierre-Emerick Aubameyang)**

“He’s just a great coach, one of the best in the world. A real leader. I learned so much from him, especially on the mental level.”

**(Philippe Coutinho)**

“He taught me everything about professional football. At that time, I was just 17 and coming up from the youth team. He introduced me to everything. He let me play.”

**(Mario Götze)**

“I’m delighted I was able to get to know such a coach and such a person as Jürgen because he’s amazing – both as a coach and a person. I learned so much from him and that means a lot.”

**(Robert Lewandowski)**

“A lot of teams have qualities, but when you have a good manager who is tactically strong and have a good club with good fans, then there’s no secret. You can achieve great things.”

**(Divock Origi)**

“If Jürgen sits in front of you with his aura, which he radiates even when speaking, with his stature, it’s really quite impressive [...] “He was definitely one of the reasons why I signed for Dortmund. Jürgen can develop players and make them better. He has a special way about him.”

**(Marco Reus)**

“Obviously without him who knows what would’ve happened. He’s the one that’s given me the most opportunities, more than I could even ask for.”

**(Trent Alexander-Arnold)**

## **Jürgen Klopp's & Pep Guardiola's careers, historic landmark and trophies (2016-2020)**

Per Guardiola and Jürgen Klopp has become Premier League Champions through two different careers, as former players and coaches; the Catalan had been a great player, the first real holding/playmaker midfielder at Barcelona under Johan Crujff , the German coach has been just a good player for FSV Mainz 05 during the 90s'.

While Pep Guardiola was winning trophies at Barcelona (6 La Liga, 2 Copa del Re, 4 National Super Cups, 1 UEFA Champions League, 1 Uefa Super Cup, 1 Uefa Cup Winners Cup), with the National Team (1 Olympic Games gold medal), and making experiences in the Italian Serie A, Jürgen Klopp was keep going on with his medium player career in Germany before becoming the coach of the team he was being playing for on 28<sup>th</sup> February 2001. When Pep Guardiola was about to stop his carrier in the field, the German coach was leading his FSV Mainz 05 to the promotion to the Bundesliga (2004).

The first “common season” between them if the 2008/2009; Per Guardiola become Fc Barcelona first team head coach after 1 year spent as FCB B's coach and Jürgen Klopp become Borussia Dortmund head coach in Germany to fight the hegemony of Bayern Munich. This is also the first big difference between them; Pep started his career as Best Teams Coach, Jürgen Klopp as Under Dog Teams coach. Thereafter, they started to be points of references for all the coaches all over the world, apart from the trophies: tiki taka, false 9, high pressure, counter-pressing, fast attacking transitions have become common words in soccer language, and all the philosophical, practical and active factors are their inventions.

The 2013/2014 season is the first fight between these two coaches, when Pep Guardiola joined Bayern Munich on a 3 years contract; the first battles happened in Germany. We can say that Pep beat Jürgen 3 – 2 during 2 seasons, as Bayern won 2 Bundesliga of 3 and 1 German National Cup of 2 against BVB, but Jürgen Klopp won the German Supercup Final 2 times in a row.

The German years have been innovation and developing years for Pep; we may say that he has said goodbye to Barcelona's tiki taka and short passing possession phases and he welcomed the “Half spaces” and Inverted Fullbacks and Wingers tactics, making Bayern one of the most interesting club in the world, even without a Champions League triumph (the Bavarian missed the final 3 times in a row against Spanish teams: Real Madrid, Barcelona and Atletico Madrid). Guardiola also converted his style of play to a center striker attacking shape, helping Lewandowsky to become one of the best forward of these recent years; the same tactic that caused him so many troubles from tactical and relational points of view with Zlatan Ibrahimovic at Barcelona (2009/2010); indeed, the Swedish player is one of the few players who hasn't a good opinion about the Catalan, together with Samuel Eto'o. Why? Maybe because “The Space” was the real striker for Pep at that time and Ibrahimovic and Eto'o suffered this tactical situation in the field. But this is also is point of strength; Guardiola is not a “closed mind” coach, and he has understood how crucial a center striker can be. Robert Lewandowsky and El Kun Aguero are the proofs.

During the fighting seasons in Germany, Klopp had already done the best for Borussia Dortmund, winning 2 Bundesliga in a row (2010/2011 and 2011/2012) thanks to counter-pressing and fast transitions to attack tactics and bringing an entire generation of players to their career's top performances. The proof is that all the players who were sold to other clubs from BVB had never reached the same level again away from Dortmund and without their coach.

On the other side, as Klopp stated the day when he was introduced to the English press as Liverpool's head coach, "I don't work to coach the best team in the world, I work to beat it"; in other words, he wants to be an underdog and try to beat the top teams. As this 2019/2020 season has just demonstrated, eventually he has done it; Liverpool is now Champions of England, and Manchester City is about 20 points behind, after 2 seasons with the Pep's Citizens at the top of the table.

Despite Klopp's evolution is blinder than the Guardiola's one, it becomes evident if Liverpool is analyzed in a deeper way; but apart from this, his passion, his emotions, his "stage" leadership, his good human being and his idea to be "The Captain of the ship" when he works for a club have always been the same; in fact, he coached Borussia Dortmund and Liverpool, 2 teams with the "warmest supporters" in their countries. "He is always right man, in the right place, at the right time."

Pep's last season in Germany is also the first one for Jürgen Klopp in England at Liverpool (8<sup>th</sup> October 2015); the next season (2016/2017) is also the first one against each other as Premier League (and Champions League) rivals. This 2019/2020 seems to be the last campaign against each other in England and to draw conclusions is very hard; Pep developed a style of play in a club without a big history but that was winning home trophies even before his arrival, and Jürgen has led Liverpool to three European finals, the reds have won the 3 most important international cups in 2019 and the Premier League for the first time in 30 years. Without judgements, this is the sum up scheme of these 4 seasons:


<b>Liverpool 2016 - 2020</b>		<b>Manchester City 2016 - 2020</b>	
2016 - 2017	4 <sup>th</sup> seat in Premier League	2016 - 2017	3 <sup>rd</sup> seat in Premier League
2017 - 2018	4 <sup>th</sup> seat in Premier League Champions League runner up	2017 - 2018	League Cup winner Premier League Winner
2018 - 2019	Champions League Winner European Super Cup Winner Fifa Club World Cup Winner 2 <sup>nd</sup> seat in Premier League	2018 - 2019	Community Shield Winner League Cup Winner Fa Cup Winner Premier League winner
2019 - 2020	Premier League Winner	2019 - 2020	?

<b>Liverpool vs Manchester City matches 2016 - 2020</b>	
<b><u>2016 - 2017</u></b>	Liverpool – Manchester City: 1 – 0 (Premier League, Anfield Road 31/12/2016) Manchester City – Liverpool: 1 – 1 (Premier League, Etihad Stadium 19/03/2017)
<b><u>2017 - 2018</u></b>	Manchester City – Liverpool: 5 – 0 (Premier League, Etihad Stadium 09/09/2017) Liverpool – Manchester City: 3 – 0 (Champions League, Anfield Road 04/04/2018) Manchester City – Liverpool: 1 – 2 (Champions League, Etihad Stadium 10/04/2018) Liverpool – Manchester City: 4 – 3 (Premier League, Anfield Road 14/01/2018)
<b><u>2018 - 2019</u></b>	Liverpool – Manchester City: 0 – 0 (Premier League, Anfield Road - 07/10/2018) Manchester City – Liverpool: 2 – 1 (Premier League, Etihad Stadium - 03/01/2019)
<b><u>2019 - 2020</u></b>	Liverpool – Manchester City: 1 – 1 (4 – 5 after penalty kicks) (Community Shield, Wembley - 04/09/2019) Liverpool – Manchester City: 3 – 1 (Premier League, Anfield Road - 10/11/2019) Manchester City – Liverpool: 4 – 0 (Premier League, Etihad Stadium - 02/07/2020)

## Liverpool formations (2016 – 2020)

- 2016/2017 Squad List

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
22	 <b>Simon Mignolet</b> Goalkeeper	Mar 6, 1988 (28)		1,93 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£10.80m
1	 <b>Loris Karius</b> Goalkeeper	Jun 22, 1993 (23)		1,89 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2021	£7.20m
13	 <b>Alexander Manninger</b> Goalkeeper	Jun 4, 1977 (39)		N/A	N/A	Jul 22, 2016		-	£180Th.
32	 <b>Joel Matip</b> Centre-Back	Aug 8, 1991 (24)	 	1,95 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£22.50m
6	 <b>Dejan Lovren</b> Centre-Back	Jul 5, 1989 (26)		1,88 m	right	Jul 27, 2014		30.06.2021	£15.30m
12	 <b>Joe Gomez</b> Centre-Back	May 23, 1997 (19)	 	1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2024	£3.60m
17	 <b>Ragnar Klavan</b> Centre-Back	Oct 30, 1985 (30)		1,87 m	left	Jul 20, 2016		-	£3.15m
18	 <b>Alberto Moreno</b> Left-Back	Jul 5, 1992 (23)		1,71 m	left	Aug 13, 2014		-	£9.00m
2	 <b>Nathaniel Clyne</b> Right-Back	Apr 5, 1991 (25)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2020	£18.90m
66	 <b>T. A. Arnold</b> Right-Back	Oct 7, 1998 (17)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£1.35m
56	 <b>Connor Randall</b> Right-Back	Oct 21, 1995 (20)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		-	£450Th.
23	 <b>Emre Can</b> Defensive Midfield	Jan 12, 1994 (22)	 	1,86 m	right	Jul 1, 2014		-	£13.50m
21	 <b>Lucas Leiva</b> Defensive Midfield	Jan 9, 1987 (29)	 	1,79 m	right	Jul 1, 2007		-	£6.30m
35	 <b>Kevin Stewart</b> Defensive Midfield	Sep 7, 1993 (22)	 	1,82 m	both	Jul 7, 2014		30.06.2021	£900Th.
5	 <b>Georginio Wijnaldum</b> Central Midfield	Nov 11, 1990 (25)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 22, 2016		30.06.2021	£25.20m
14	 <b>Jordan Henderson</b> Central Midfield	Jun 17, 1990 (26)		1,87 m	right	Jul 1, 2011		30.06.2023	£25.20m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
7	 <b>James Milner</b> Central Midfield	Jan 4, 1986 (30)		1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2022	£10.80m
-	 <b>Ovie Ejaria</b> Central Midfield	Nov 18, 1997 (18)	 	1,84 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		-	£450Th.
10	 <b>Philippe Coutinho</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 12, 1992 (24)	 	1,72 m	right	Jan 30, 2013		30.06.2022	£40.50m
20	 <b>Adam Lallana</b> Attacking Midfield	May 10, 1988 (28)		1,72 m	both	Jul 1, 2014		31.07.2020	£22.50m
58	 <b>Ben Woodburn</b> Attacking Midfield	Oct 15, 1999 (16)	 	1,74 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2022	£1.35m
19	 <b>Sadio Mané</b> Left Winger	Apr 10, 1992 (24)		1,74 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£36.00m
54	 <b>Sheyi Ojo</b> Right Winger	Jun 19, 1997 (19)	 	1,79 m	left	Jul 7, 2015		30.06.2020	£1.80m
-	 <b>Harry Wilson</b> Right Winger	Mar 22, 1997 (19)	 	1,73 m	left	-	-	-	£90Th.
9	 <b>Roberto Firmino</b> Centre-Forward	Oct 2, 1991 (24)		1,81 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2023	£34.20m
15	 <b>Daniel Sturridge</b> Centre-Forward	Sep 1, 1989 (26)		1,85 m	left	Jan 2, 2013		-	£18.00m
27	 <b>Divock Origi</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 18, 1995 (21)	 	1,85 m	right	Jul 29, 2014		30.06.2024	£10.80m
28	 <b>Danny Ings</b> Centre-Forward	Jul 23, 1992 (23)		1,78 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2020	£7.20m
-	 <b>Rhian Brewster</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 1, 2000 (16)		1,80 m	right	-	-	-	-

- **Recurrent systems of play**






4-2-3-1 3%	4-3-1-2 3%	4-1-4-1 3%	3-5-2 2%
4-4-2 2%	4-5-1 2%	4-2-2-2 1%	3-4-2-1 1%

- Main starting 11



- 2017/2018 Squad List


#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
1	 <b>Loris Karius</b> Goalkeeper	Jun 22, 1993 (24)		1,89 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2021	£10.80m
22	 <b>Simon Mignolet</b> Goalkeeper	Mar 6, 1988 (29)		1,93 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£9.00m
52	 <b>Danny Ward</b> Goalkeeper	Jun 22, 1993 (24)		1,91 m	right	Jan 30, 2012		30.06.2021	£2.25m
34	 <b>Ádám Bogdán</b> Goalkeeper	Sep 27, 1987 (29)		1,94 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		-	£900Th.
4	 <b>Virgil van Dijk</b> Centre-Back	Jul 8, 1991 (25)	 	1,93 m	right	Jan 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£45.00m
32	 <b>Joel Matip</b> Centre-Back	Aug 8, 1991 (25)	 	1,95 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£22.50m
12	 <b>Joe Gomez</b> Centre-Back	May 23, 1997 (20)	 	1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2024	£19.80m
6	 <b>Dejan Lovren</b> Centre-Back	Jul 5, 1989 (27)		1,88 m	right	Jul 27, 2014		30.06.2021	£18.00m
17	 <b>Ragnar Klavan</b> Centre-Back	Oct 30, 1985 (31)		1,87 m	left	Jul 20, 2016		-	£3.15m
26	 <b>Andrew Robertson</b> Left-Back	Mar 11, 1994 (23)		1,78 m	left	Jul 21, 2017		30.06.2024	£22.50m
18	 <b>Alberto Moreno</b> Left-Back	Jul 5, 1992 (24)		1,71 m	left	Aug 13, 2014		-	£9.00m
66	 <b>T. A. Arnold</b> Right-Back	Oct 7, 1998 (18)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£22.50m
2	 <b>Nathaniel Clyne</b> Right-Back	Apr 5, 1991 (26)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2020	£18.00m
23	 <b>Emre Can</b> Defensive Midfield	Jan 12, 1994 (23)	 	1,86 m	right	Jul 1, 2014		-	£27.00m
21	 <b>Alex O. Chamberlain</b> Central Midfield	Aug 15, 1993 (23)		1,75 m	right	Aug 31, 2017		30.06.2023	£36.00m
5	 <b>Georginio Wijnaldum</b> Central Midfield	Nov 11, 1990 (26)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 22, 2016		30.06.2021	£27.00m
14	 <b>Jordan Henderson</b> Central Midfield	Jun 17, 1990 (27)		1,87 m	right	Jul 1, 2011		30.06.2023	£22.50m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
7	 <b>James Milner</b> Central Midfield	Jan 4, 1986 (31)		1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2022	£13.50m
-	 <b>Curtis Jones</b> Central Midfield	Jan 30, 2001 (16)		1,85 m	right	-		-	-
-	 <b>Philippe Coutinho</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 12, 1992 (25)		1,72 m	right	Jan 30, 2013		30.06.2022	£90.00m
20	 <b>Adam Lallana</b> Attacking Midfield	May 10, 1988 (29)		1,72 m	both	Jul 1, 2014		31.07.2020	£22.50m
58	 <b>Ben Woodburn</b> Attacking Midfield	Oct 15, 1999 (17)		1,74 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2022	£4.50m
19	 <b>Sadio Mané</b> Left Winger	Apr 10, 1992 (25)		1,74 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£63.00m
11	 <b>Mohamed Salah</b> Right Winger	Jun 15, 1992 (25)		1,75 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£135.00m
9	 <b>Roberto Firmino</b> Centre-Forward	Oct 2, 1991 (25)		1,81 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2023	£72.00m
29	 <b>Dominic Solanke</b> Centre-Forward	Sep 14, 1997 (19)		1,86 m	right	Jul 10, 2017		30.06.2022	£9.00m
28	 <b>Danny Ings</b> Centre-Forward	Jul 23, 1992 (24)		1,78 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2020	£7.20m

- Recurrent systems of play



4-3-3 78%





- Main starting 11



- 2018/2019 Squad List

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
13	 <b>Alisson</b> Goalkeeper	Oct 2, 1992 (25)		1,91 m	right	Jul 19, 2018		30.06.2024	£72.00m
22	 <b>Simon Mignolet</b> Goalkeeper	Mar 6, 1988 (30)		1,93 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£7.20m
-	 <b>Kamil Grabara</b> Goalkeeper	Jan 8, 1999 (19)		1,95 m	right	-		-	£360Th.
-	 <b>Caoimhin Kelleher</b> Goalkeeper	Nov 23, 1998 (19)		1,88 m	right	-		-	-
4	 <b>Virgil van Dijk</b> Centre-Back	Jul 8, 1991 (26)		1,93 m	right	Jan 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£81.00m
12	 <b>Joe Gomez</b> Centre-Back	May 23, 1997 (21)		1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2024	£31.50m
32	 <b>Joel Matip</b> Centre-Back	Aug 8, 1991 (26)	 	1,95 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£27.00m
6	 <b>Dejan Lovren</b> Centre-Back	Jul 5, 1989 (28)		1,88 m	right	Jul 27, 2014		30.06.2021	£18.00m
26	 <b>Andrew Robertson</b> Left-Back	Mar 11, 1994 (24)		1,78 m	left	Jul 21, 2017		30.06.2024	£54.00m
18	 <b>Alberto Moreno</b> Left-Back	Jul 5, 1992 (25)		1,71 m	left	Aug 13, 2014		-	£8.10m
66	 <b>T. A. Arnold</b> Right-Back	Oct 7, 1998 (19)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£72.00m
-	 <b>Ki-Jana Hoever</b> Right-Back	Jan 18, 2002 (16)		1,80 m	right	-		-	-
3	 <b>Fabinho</b> Defensive Midfield	Oct 23, 1993 (24)		1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£45.00m
8	 <b>Naby Keita</b> Central Midfield	Feb 10, 1995 (23)		1,72 m	right	Jul 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£54.00m
5	 <b>Georginio Wijnaldum</b> Central Midfield	Nov 11, 1990 (27)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 22, 2016		30.06.2021	£45.00m
14	 <b>Jordan Henderson</b> Central Midfield	Jun 17, 1990 (28)		1,87 m	right	Jul 1, 2011		30.06.2023	£31.50m
21	 <b>Alex O. Chamberlain</b> Central Midfield	Aug 15, 1993 (24)		1,75 m	right	Aug 31, 2017		30.06.2023	£31.50m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
7	 <b>James Milner</b> Central Midfield	Jan 4, 1986 (32)		1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2022	£13.50m
-	 <b>Curtis Jones</b> Central Midfield	Jan 30, 2001 (17)		1,85 m	right	-		-	-
20	 <b>Adam Lallana</b> Attacking Midfield	May 10, 1988 (30)		1,72 m	both	Jul 1, 2014		31.07.2020	£13.50m
-	 <b>Isaac Christie-Davies</b> Attacking Midfield	Oct 18, 1997 (20)	 	1,88 m	right	-		-	-
10	 <b>Sadio Mané</b> Left Winger	Apr 10, 1992 (26)		1,74 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£108.00m
11	 <b>Mohamed Salah</b> Right Winger	Jun 15, 1992 (26)		1,75 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£135.00m
23	 <b>Xherdan Shaqiri</b> Right Winger	Oct 10, 1991 (26)	 	1,69 m	left	Jul 13, 2018		30.06.2023	£22.50m
-	 <b>Rafael Camacho</b> Right Winger	May 22, 2000 (18)	 	1,75 m	right	-		-	-
9	 <b>Roberto Firmino</b> Centre-Forward	Oct 2, 1991 (26)		1,81 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2023	£72.00m
27	 <b>Divock Origi</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 18, 1995 (23)	 	1,85 m	right	Jul 29, 2014		30.06.2024	£18.00m
-	 <b>Dominic Solanke</b> Centre-Forward	Sep 14, 1997 (20)	 	1,86 m	right	Jul 10, 2017		30.06.2022	£16.20m
15	 <b>Daniel Sturridge</b> Centre-Forward	Sep 1, 1989 (28)		1,85 m	left	Jan 2, 2013		-	£13.50m
-	 <b>Rhian Brewster</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 1, 2000 (18)		1,80 m	right	-		-	-

- **Recurrent systems of play**



4-3-3 65%



4-2-3-1 23%

4-4-2  
1%

- **Main starting 11**




- 2019/2020 Squad List

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
1	 <b>Alisson</b> Goalkeeper	Oct 2, 1992 (27)		1,91 m	right	Jul 19, 2018		30.06.2024	£64.80m
13	 <b>Adrián</b> Goalkeeper	Jan 3, 1987 (33)		1,90 m	right	Aug 5, 2019		30.06.2021	£3.60m
62	 <b>Caoimhin Kelleher</b> Goalkeeper	Nov 23, 1998 (21)		1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2019		30.06.2022	£810Th.
22	 <b>Andy Lonergan</b> Goalkeeper	Oct 19, 1983 (36)		1,93 m	left	Aug 12, 2019		31.07.2020	£225Th.
4	 <b>Virgil van Dijk</b> Centre-Back	Jul 8, 1991 (28)	 	1,93 m	right	Jan 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£72.00m
12	 <b>Joe Gomez</b> Centre-Back	May 23, 1997 (23)	 	1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2024	£30.15m
32	 <b>Joel Matip</b> Centre-Back	Aug 8, 1991 (28)	 	1,95 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£28.80m
6	 <b>Dejan Lovren</b> Centre-Back	Jul 5, 1989 (30)		1,88 m	right	Jul 27, 2014		30.06.2021	£14.40m
26	 <b>Andrew Robertson</b> Left-Back	Mar 11, 1994 (26)		1,78 m	left	Jul 21, 2017		30.06.2024	£57.60m
66	 <b>T. A. Arnold</b> Right-Back	Oct 7, 1998 (21)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2024	£89.10m
3	 <b>Fabinho</b> Defensive Midfield	Oct 23, 1993 (26)		1,88 m	right	Jul 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£50.40m
5	 <b>Georginio Wijnaldum</b> Central Midfield	Nov 11, 1990 (29)	 	1,75 m	right	Jul 22, 2016		30.06.2021	£36.00m
8	 <b>Naby Keita</b> Central Midfield	Feb 10, 1995 (25)	 	1,72 m	right	Jul 1, 2018		30.06.2023	£30.15m
14	 <b>Jordan Henderson</b> Central Midfield	Jun 17, 1990 (30)		1,87 m	right	Jul 1, 2011		30.06.2023	£25.20m
15	 <b>Alex O. Chamberlain</b> Central Midfield	Aug 15, 1993 (26)		1,75 m	right	Aug 31, 2017		30.06.2023	£25.20m
7	 <b>James Milner</b> Central Midfield	Jan 4, 1986 (34)		1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2022	£5.85m
48	 <b>Curtis Jones*</b> Central Midfield	Jan 30, 2001 (19)		1,85 m	right	-		30.06.2024	£1.62m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
20	 <b>Adam Lallana</b> Attacking Midfield	May 10, 1988 (32)		1,72 m	both	Jul 1, 2014		31.07.2020	£8.55m
10	 <b>Sadio Mané</b> Left Winger	Apr 10, 1992 (28)		1,74 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£108.00m
18	 <b>Takumi Minamino</b> Left Winger	Jan 16, 1995 (25)		1,74 m	right	Jan 1, 2020		30.06.2024	£9.00m
11	 <b>Mohamed Salah</b> Right Winger	Jun 15, 1992 (28)		1,75 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£108.00m
23	 <b>Xherdan Shaqiri</b> Right Winger	Oct 10, 1991 (28)		1,69 m	left	Jul 13, 2018		30.06.2023	£14.40m
9	 <b>Roberto Firmino</b> Centre-Forward	Oct 2, 1991 (28)		1,81 m	right	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2023	£64.80m
27	 <b>Divock Origi</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 18, 1995 (25)		1,85 m	right	Jul 29, 2014		30.06.2024	£14.40m

- **Recurrent systems of play**



- **Main starting 11**



## Manchester City formations (2016 – 2020)

- 2016/2017 Squad List

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
1	 <b>Claudio Bravo</b> Goalkeeper	Apr 13, 1983 (33)	 	1,84 m	right	Aug 25, 2016		31.07.2020	£7.20m
13	 <b>Willv Caballero</b> Goalkeeper	Sep 28, 1981 (34)	 	1,86 m	right	Jul 8, 2014		-	£1.35m
54	 <b>Angus Gunn</b> Goalkeeper	Jan 22, 1996 (20)	 	1,96 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2020	£225Th.
5	 <b>John Stones</b> Centre-Back	May 28, 1994 (22)		1,88 m	right	Aug 9, 2016		30.06.2022	£31.50m
30	 <b>Nicolás Otamendi</b> Centre-Back	Feb 12, 1988 (28)		1,83 m	right	Aug 20, 2015		30.06.2022	£27.00m
4	 <b>Vincent Kompany</b> Centre-Back	Apr 10, 1986 (30)	 	1,90 m	right	Aug 22, 2008		-	£19.80m
20	 <b>Eliakim Mangala</b> Centre-Back	Feb 13, 1991 (25)	 	1,87 m	left	Aug 11, 2014		30.06.2020	£13.50m
11	 <b>Aleksandar Kolarov</b> Left-Back	Nov 10, 1985 (30)		1,87 m	left	Jul 24, 2010		-	£9.00m
22	 <b>Gaël Clichy</b> Left-Back	Jul 26, 1985 (30)	 	1,76 m	left	Jul 4, 2011		-	£6.30m
35	 <b>Oleksandr Zinchenko</b> Left-Back	Dec 15, 1996 (19)		1,75 m	left	Jul 4, 2016		30.06.2024	£4.05m
-	 <b>Angeliño</b> Left-Back	Jan 4, 1997 (19)		1,70 m	left	-	-	-	£450Th.
15	 <b>Jesús Navas</b> Right-Back	Nov 21, 1985 (30)		1,72 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		-	£10.80m
5	 <b>Pablo Zabaleta</b> Right-Back	Jan 16, 1985 (31)	 	1,76 m	right	Aug 31, 2008		-	£6.30m
3	 <b>Bacary Sagna</b> Right-Back	Feb 14, 1983 (33)	 	1,76 m	right	Jul 1, 2014		-	£3.60m
25	 <b>Fernandinho</b> Defensive Midfield	May 4, 1985 (31)		1,79 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£16.20m
6	 <b>Fernando</b> Defensive Midfield	Jul 25, 1987 (28)	 	1,83 m	right	Jul 1, 2014		-	£9.00m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
8	 <b>Ilkay Gündogan</b> Central Midfield	Oct 24, 1990 (25)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£27.00m
18	 <b>Fabian Delph</b> Central Midfield	Nov 21, 1989 (26)	 	1,74 m	left	Jul 17, 2015		30.06.2020	£7.20m
42	 <b>Yaya Touré</b> Central Midfield	May 13, 1983 (33)	 	1,88 m	right	Jul 2, 2010		-	£7.20m
75	 <b>Aleix García</b> Central Midfield	Jun 28, 1997 (19)		1,73 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2020	£900Th.
-	 <b>Phil Foden</b> Central Midfield	May 28, 2000 (16)		1,71 m	left	-	-	-	-
17	 <b>Kevin De Bruyne</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 28, 1991 (25)		1,81 m	right	Aug 30, 2015		30.06.2023	£58.50m
21	 <b>David Silva</b> Attacking Midfield	Jan 8, 1986 (30)		1,70 m	left	Jul 14, 2010		31.07.2020	£27.00m
-	 <b>Brahim Díaz</b> Attacking Midfield	Aug 3, 1999 (16)	 	1,71 m	both	-	-	-	-
7	 <b>Raheem Sterling</b> Left Winger	Dec 8, 1994 (21)	 	1,70 m	right	Jul 14, 2015		30.06.2023	£40.50m
19	 <b>Leroy Sané</b> Left Winger	Jan 11, 1996 (20)	 	1,84 m	left	Aug 2, 2016		30.06.2021	£31.50m
9	 <b>Nolito</b> Left Winger	Oct 15, 1986 (29)		1,75 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2020	£10.80m
10	 <b>Sergio Agüero</b> Centre-Forward	Jun 2, 1988 (28)	 	1,73 m	right	Jul 28, 2011		30.06.2021	£58.50m
33	 <b>Gabriel Jesus</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 3, 1997 (19)		1,75 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£27.00m
72	 <b>Kelechi Iheanacho</b> Centre-Forward	Oct 3, 1996 (19)		1,85 m	left	Jul 1, 2015		30.06.2021	£13.50m



- Recurrent systems of play



- Main starting 11



- 2017/2018 Squad List

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
31	 <b>Ederson</b> Goalkeeper	Aug 17, 1993 (23)		1,88 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£45.00m
1	 <b>Claudio Bravo</b> Goalkeeper	Apr 13, 1983 (34)		1,84 m	right	Aug 25, 2016		31.07.2020	£3.15m
5	 <b>John Stones</b> Centre-Back	May 28, 1994 (23)		1,88 m	right	Aug 9, 2016		30.06.2022	£45.00m
14	 <b>Aymeric Laporte</b> Centre-Back	May 27, 1994 (23)		1,90 m	left	Jan 30, 2018		30.06.2025	£45.00m
30	 <b>Nicolás Otamendi</b> Centre-Back	Feb 12, 1988 (29)		1,83 m	right	Aug 20, 2015		30.06.2022	£31.50m
4	 <b>Vincent Kompany</b> Centre-Back	Apr 10, 1986 (31)		1,90 m	right	Aug 22, 2008		-	£9.00m
22	 <b>Benjamin Mendy</b> Left-Back	Jul 17, 1994 (22)		1,85 m	left	Jul 24, 2017		30.06.2023	£36.00m
35	 <b>Oleksandr Zinchen</b> Left-Back	Dec 15, 1996 (20)		1,75 m	left	Jul 4, 2016		30.06.2024	£6.30m
2	 <b>Kyle Walker</b> Right-Back	May 28, 1990 (27)		1,83 m	right	Jul 14, 2017		30.06.2024	£45.00m
3	 <b>Danilo</b> Right-Back	Jul 15, 1991 (25)		1,84 m	right	Jul 23, 2017		30.06.2024	£18.00m
25	 <b>Fernandinho</b> Defensive Midfield	May 4, 1985 (32)		1,79 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£13.50m
8	 <b>Ilkay Gündogan</b> Central Midfield	Oct 24, 1990 (26)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£36.00m
18	 <b>Fabian Delph</b> Central Midfield	Nov 21, 1989 (27)		1,74 m	left	Jul 17, 2015		30.06.2020	£13.50m
47	 <b>Phil Foden</b> Central Midfield	May 28, 2000 (17)		1,71 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2024	£6.30m
42	 <b>Yaya Touré</b> Central Midfield	May 13, 1983 (34)		1,88 m	right	Jul 2, 2010		-	£2.25m
17	 <b>Kevin De Bruyne</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 28, 1991 (26)		1,81 m	right	Aug 30, 2015		30.06.2023	£135.00m
21	 <b>David Silva</b> Attacking Midfield	Jan 8, 1986 (31)		1,70 m	left	Jul 14, 2010		31.07.2020	£27.00m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
55	 <b>Brahim Díaz</b> Attacking Midfield	Aug 3, 1999 (17)		1,71 m	both	Jan 1, 2018		-	£4.50m
7	 <b>Raheem Sterling</b> Left Winger	Dec 8, 1994 (22)	 	1,70 m	right	Jul 14, 2015		30.06.2023	£81.00m
19	 <b>Leroy Sané</b> Left Winger	Jan 11, 1996 (21)	 	1,84 m	left	Aug 2, 2016		30.06.2021	£81.00m
20	 <b>Bernardo Silva</b> Right Winger	Aug 10, 1994 (22)		1,73 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£45.00m
10	 <b>Sergio Agüero</b> Centre-Forward	Jun 2, 1988 (29)	 	1,73 m	right	Jul 28, 2011		30.06.2021	£72.00m
33	 <b>Gabriel Jesus</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 3, 1997 (20)		1,75 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£72.00m
-	 <b>Lukas Nmecha</b> Centre-Forward	Dec 14, 1998 (18)	 	1,85 m	right	-		-	-

- Recurrent systems of play



3-5-2 7%	4-1-4-1 6%	4-2-3-1 3%	3-4-2-1 3%
3-5-1-1 2%	4-4-2 1%	4-3-1-1 1%	

- Main starting 11



- 2018/2019 Squad List

#	<u>Player</u>	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
31	 <b>Ederson</b> Goalkeeper	Aug 17, 1993 (24)		1,88 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£63.00m
1	 <b>Claudio Bravo</b> Goalkeeper	Apr 13, 1983 (35)	 	1,84 m	right	Aug 25, 2016		31.07.2020	£2.25m
14	 <b>Aymeric Laporte</b> Centre-Back	May 27, 1994 (24)		1,90 m	left	Jan 30, 2018		30.06.2025	£67.50m
5	 <b>John Stones</b> Centre-Back	May 28, 1994 (24)		1,88 m	right	Aug 9, 2016		30.06.2022	£54.00m
30	 <b>Nicolás Otamendi</b> Centre-Back	Feb 12, 1988 (30)		1,83 m	right	Aug 20, 2015		30.06.2022	£22.50m
15	 <b>Eliaquim Mangala</b> Centre-Back	Feb 13, 1991 (27)	 	1,87 m	left	Aug 11, 2014		30.06.2020	£9.00m
4	 <b>Vincent Kompany</b> Centre-Back	Apr 10, 1986 (32)	 	1,90 m	right	Aug 22, 2008		-	£7.20m
22	 <b>Benjamin Mendy</b> Left-Back	Jul 17, 1994 (23)	 	1,85 m	left	Jul 24, 2017		30.06.2023	£31.50m
35	 <b>Oleksandr Zinchenko</b> Left-Back	Dec 15, 1996 (21)		1,75 m	left	Jul 4, 2016		30.06.2024	£18.00m
2	 <b>Kyle Walker</b> Right-Back	May 28, 1990 (28)		1,83 m	right	Jul 14, 2017		30.06.2024	£45.00m
3	 <b>Danilo</b> Right-Back	Jul 15, 1991 (26)		1,84 m	right	Jul 23, 2017		30.06.2024	£18.00m
25	 <b>Fernandinho</b> Defensive Midfield	May 4, 1985 (33)		1,79 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£10.80m
8	 <b>Ilkay Gündogan</b> Central Midfield	Oct 24, 1990 (27)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£45.00m
47	 <b>Phil Foden</b> Central Midfield	May 28, 2000 (18)		1,71 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2024	£22.50m
18	 <b>Fabian Delph</b> Central Midfield	Nov 21, 1989 (28)	 	1,74 m	left	Jul 17, 2015		30.06.2020	£13.50m
17	 <b>Kevin De Bruyne</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 28, 1991 (27)		1,81 m	right	Aug 30, 2015		30.06.2023	£117.00m
21	 <b>David Silva</b> Attacking Midfield	Jan 8, 1986 (32)		1,70 m	left	Jul 14, 2010		31.07.2020	£18.00m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
55	 <b>Brahim Díaz</b> Attacking Midfield	Aug 3, 1999 (18)		1,71 m	both	Jan 1, 2018		-	£15.30m
7	 <b>Raheem Sterling</b> Left Winger	Dec 8, 1994 (23)	 	1,70 m	right	Jul 14, 2015		30.06.2023	£126.00m
19	 <b>Leroy Sané</b> Left Winger	Jan 11, 1996 (22)	 	1,84 m	left	Aug 2, 2016		30.06.2021	£90.00m
20	 <b>Bernardo Silva</b> Right Winger	Aug 10, 1994 (23)		1,73 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£90.00m
26	 <b>Riyad Mahrez</b> Right Winger	Feb 21, 1991 (27)	 	1,79 m	left	Jul 10, 2018		30.06.2023	£54.00m
33	 <b>Gabriel Jesus</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 3, 1997 (21)		1,75 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£63.00m
10	 <b>Sergio Agüero</b> Centre-Forward	Jun 2, 1988 (30)	 	1,73 m	right	Jul 28, 2011		30.06.2021	£58.50m

- Recurrent systems of play



- Main starting 11



- **2019/2020 Squad List**

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
31	 <b>Ederson</b> Goalkeeper	Aug 17, 1993 (26)		1,88 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£50.40m
1	 <b>Claudio Bravo</b> Goalkeeper	Apr 13, 1983 (37)		1,84 m	right	Aug 25, 2016		31.07.2020	£1.08m
33	 <b>Scott Carson</b> Goalkeeper	Sep 3, 1985 (34)		1,88 m	right	Aug 8, 2019		31.07.2020	£720Th.
14	 <b>Aymeric Laporte</b> Centre-Back	May 27, 1994 (26)		1,90 m	left	Jan 30, 2018		30.06.2025	£54.00m
5	 <b>John Stones</b> Centre-Back	May 28, 1994 (26)		1,88 m	right	Aug 9, 2016		30.06.2022	£32.40m
30	 <b>Nicolás Otamendi</b> Centre-Back	Feb 12, 1988 (32)		1,83 m	right	Aug 20, 2015		30.06.2022	£13.05m
50	 <b>Eric García</b> Centre-Back	Jan 9, 2001 (19)		1,83 m	right	Jul 1, 2019		30.06.2022	£5.67m
22	 <b>Benjamin Mendy</b> Left-Back	Jul 17, 1994 (25)		1,85 m	left	Jul 24, 2017		30.06.2023	£25.20m
11	 <b>Oleksandr Zinchenko</b> Left-Back	Dec 15, 1996 (23)		1,75 m	left	Jul 4, 2016		30.06.2024	£21.60m
2	 <b>Kyle Walker</b> Right-Back	May 28, 1990 (30)		1,83 m	right	Jul 14, 2017		30.06.2024	£36.00m
27	 <b>João Cancelo</b> Right-Back	May 27, 1994 (26)		1,82 m	right	Aug 7, 2019		30.06.2025	£32.40m
-	 <b>Yan Couto</b> Right-Back	Jun 3, 2002 (18)		1,68 m	right	Jul 1, 2020		30.06.2025	£3.24m
16	 <b>Rodri</b> Defensive Midfield	Jun 22, 1996 (24)		1,91 m	right	Jul 4, 2019		30.06.2024	£57.60m
25	 <b>Fernandinho</b> Defensive Midfield	May 4, 1985 (35)		1,79 m	right	Jul 1, 2013		30.06.2021	£7.20m
-	 <b>Ante Palaversa</b> Defensive Midfield	Apr 6, 2000 (20)		1,87 m	right	Jan 31, 2019		30.06.2023	£3.24m
8	 <b>Ilkay Gündogan</b> Central Midfield	Oct 24, 1990 (29)		1,80 m	right	Jul 1, 2016		30.06.2023	£36.00m
47	 <b>Phil Foden</b> Central Midfield	May 28, 2000 (20)		1,71 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2024	£24.30m

#	Player	Date of birth / Age	Nat.	Height	Foot	Joined	Signed from	Contract expires	Market value
17	 <b>Kevin De Bruyne</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 28, 1991 (29)		1,81 m	right	Aug 30, 2015		30.06.2023	£108.00m
21	 <b>David Silva</b> Attacking Midfield	Jan 8, 1986 (34)		1,70 m	left	Jul 14, 2010		31.07.2020	£10.80m
77	 <b>Rvotaro Meshino</b> Attacking Midfield	Jun 18, 1998 (22)		1,71 m	right	Aug 8, 2019		30.06.2022	£405Th.
7	 <b>Raheem Sterling</b> Left Winger	Dec 8, 1994 (25)		1,70 m	right	Jul 14, 2015		30.06.2023	£115.20m
19	 <b>Leroy Sané</b> Left Winger	Jan 11, 1996 (24)		1,84 m	left	Aug 2, 2016		30.06.2021	£72.00m
20	 <b>Bernardo Silva</b> Right Winger	Aug 10, 1994 (25)		1,73 m	left	Jul 1, 2017		30.06.2025	£72.00m
26	 <b>Rivad Mahrez</b> Right Winger	Feb 21, 1991 (29)		1,79 m	left	Jul 10, 2018		30.06.2023	£43.20m
9	 <b>Gabriel Jesus</b> Centre-Forward	Apr 3, 1997 (23)		1,75 m	right	Jan 1, 2017		30.06.2023	£50.40m
10	 <b>Sergio Agüero</b> Centre-Forward	Jun 2, 1988 (32)		1,73 m	right	Jul 28, 2011		30.06.2021	£46.80m

- Recurrent systems of play



- Main starting 11





## Liverpool and Manchester City attacking stats comparison

- **Liverpool 2016 – 2020**

From 2016 to 2020, Jürgen Klopp has made Liverpool a possession team; this means that he has evolved as a coach too from the counter-pressing and fast transitions to attack tactics that has made great Borussia Dortmund. Reds' possession style is different from the Citizens' one, it's more "open play" and less "positional play", but Liverpool has become a more efficient team.

POSSESSION								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
Ball possession, sec	118128	2072	130517	2039	125285	2021	120804	2119
Ball possession, %	61%		58%		59%		61%	
Ball possessions, quantity	6378	112	6825	107	6686	108	6117	107
Possessions' average time	19		19		19		20	
<b>Passes</b>	<b>36471</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>39240</b>	<b>613</b>	<b>39293</b>	<b>634</b>	<b>38562</b>	<b>677</b>
<b>Accurate passes</b>	<b>31424</b>	<b>551</b>	<b>33576</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>33678</b>	<b>543</b>	<b>33165</b>	<b>582</b>
Accurate passes, %	86%		86%		86%		86%	
<b>Key passes</b>	<b>1486</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1526</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1345</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1169</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>Key passes accurate</b>	<b>760</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>701</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>599</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Key passes accuracy %</b>	<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>52%</b>	
Dribbles	1899	33	1876	29	1626	26	1423	25
Dribbles successful	1088	19	1080	17	900	15	779	14
Successful dribbles, %	57%		58%		55%		55%	

The proofs are the 37 passes per match more of the last season in relation to the first one, the 31 more accurate passes per match; on the other side Liverpool tries less key passes (21 against 26 of 2016/2017), but the accuracy of the passes has increased (52% against 50%).

Liverpool passes the ball much more than dribbling it (25 dribbles per match against 33 of the first season) and the efficiency has decreased, as the tactical objective is to finish the moves in the final third rather than driving the ball up in the field.

The total quantity of possessions has decreased but the the effective time and the average time have increased; this means that they lose less ball then ever during this last season (2019 – 2020).

	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
Lost balls	4820	85	3929	61	4280	69	4045	54
Lost balls in own half	928	16	636	10	763	12	641	11

The loss ball average is a big improvement for Klopp's squad; they lose about 30 ball less than 4 years ago and 5 inside the defensive half; this last data is indicative on how Virgil Van Dijk, Alisson and Trent Alexander-Arnold are crucial for the possession phase and the building process during these last seasons.

Confirming the possession and the safe ball keeping idea, the attacking challenges average per match have decreased from 91 (2016/2017) to 73 (2019/2020), maintaining the same efficacy; this means that Liverpool attacks with more attention in relation to the past and that the attacking moves lead to a finishing stage more than in the past. The positional attacks average has slightly decreased (from 76 to 72 per match), as well as those with a shot (8 per match). Liverpool has also become a less counter-attacking team (16 per game in 2016/2017 and 17 per game in 2017/2018) to an average of 13 in 2019/2020; on the other side, the efficacy is the same of the past seasons.

TYPES OF ATTACKS								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
<b>Attacking challenges</b>	<b>5164</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>5123</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>4550</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4186</b>	<b>73</b>
Attacking challenges won	2339	41	2299	36	1972	32	1835	32
Challenges in attack / won, %	45%		45%		43%		44%	
<b>Positional attacks</b>	<b>4331</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>4410</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>4214</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>4092</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>Positional attacks with a shot</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>8</b>
% of efficiency for positional attacks	12%		13%		12%		12%	
<b>Counter-attacks</b>	<b>901</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>1062</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>899</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>735</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Counter-attacks with a shot</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>2,8</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>3,3</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>2,5</b>
% of efficiency for counterattacks	18%		20%		17%		19%	
Set pieces attacks	527	9	531	8	598	10	590	10
Attacks with shots - Set pieces attacks	168	3	201	3,1	209	3,4	177	3,1
% of efficiency for set-piece attacks	32%		38%		35%		30%	
Free-kick attacks	139	2,6	129	2	148	2,4	139	2,4
Free-kick attacks with shots	56	0,98	60	0,94	56	0,9	54	0,95
% of efficiency for free-kick attacks	40%		47%		38%		39%	
Corners	361	6	358	5,6	381	6	396	7
Corner attacks	396	0,04	353	5,5	381	6	396	7
Corner attacks with shots	106	1,86	125	1,95	124	2	126	1,86
% of efficiency for corner attacks	27%		35%		33%		27%	
Throw-in attacks	47	0,82	32	0,5	51	0,82	47	0,82
Throw-in attacks with shots	9	0,16	4	0,06	11	0,18	9	0,16
% of efficiency for throw-in attacks	19%		13%		22%		19%	
Free-kick shots	24	0,42	32	0,5	29	0,47	28	0,49

The efficacy of the entrances on opposition's half has increased in relation to the last two seasons, when Liverpool was "studying" to become a possession team and they are now back to the 2016/2017 season, when Liverpool was still fast transitions' team. At the same time, the entrances on the final third have come back to 2016/2017 level, after a little decreased of the past 2 seasons.

FINISHING								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
<b>Entrances on opponent's half</b>	<b>4147</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4314</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>4308</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>4113</b>	<b>72</b>
Entrances on final third of opponent's half	2868	50	3027	47	2967	48	2900	51
Entrances to the opponent's box	1202	21	1396	22	1322	21	1207	21
<b>Left-side attacks</b>	<b>1776</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>1696</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1665</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1580</b>	<b>28</b>
Attacks with shots - left side	169	3	201	3,1	164	2,7	186	3,3
Efficiency for attacks through the left flank, %	10%		12%		10%		12%	
<b>Attacks - center</b>	<b>1680</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1697</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1388</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1230</b>	<b>22</b>
Attacks with shots - center	294	5,2	336	5,3	234	3,8	190	3,3
Efficiency for attacks through the central zone, %	18%		20%		17%		15%	
<b>Attacks - right side</b>	<b>1776</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2079</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>2060</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>35</b>
Attacks with shots - right side	210	3,7	219	3,4	226	3,7	239	4,2
Efficiency for attacks through the right flank, %	12%		11%		11%		12%	
<b>Crosses</b>	<b>712</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>848</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>994</b>	<b>17</b>
Crosses accurate	206	3,6	218	3,4	207	3,3	230	4
Accurate crosses, %	29%		26%		25%		23%	
<b>Chances</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>4,8</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>432</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Chances successful</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>1,86</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>121</b>	<b>2,1</b>
<b>Chances, % of conversion</b>	<b>24%</b>		<b>29%</b>		<b>32%</b>		<b>28%</b>	

During finishing phases, the Reds have become a more crossing team, thanks to the right and left fullbacks (Trent Alexander Arnold and Robertson); from 12 crosses per game in 2016/2017 to 17 in 2019/2020. The right side of the attacking shape is the preferred one to attack (35) in relation to the left one (22) which is mainly used by Robertson to dribble the up in the field, Van Dijk to build up and distribute and by Manè to receive in behind the defenders from the midfielders.

The most crucial data of the finishing phase is the decisive increasing of the chances created: from 4,8 per game in 2016/2017 to the 7/8 per game of the following seasons; at the same time, the success of the created chances and the percentage of conversion have increased so much, proving that Klopp has made Liverpool an efficient machine. The data of this last season have decreased a little because of more defensive approach of the team.

Apart from the more defensive based team's idea, the average of shots per game and the shots on target per game have remained the same through the years.

The average of possession has increased, as well as the quantity of passes and the shots' average is the same of the previous seasons; this means that the phases of possession are more reasoned and that they are used to move the opposition; opponents defend deeper in the field due to Reds forwards' speed through open spaces and the consequence is the increase of possession quantity to arrive the final stages of the move. Despite this, Liverpool is nowadays a very efficient team; attacking efficacy has increased, as the style of play has developed from a direct attacking possession to an indirect possession to find the right space to attack.

<b>SHOOTING ON GOAL</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
<b>Shots</b>	<b>871</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1024</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>902</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>851</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Shots on target</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>5,9</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>6</b>
Shots on target, %	39%		41%		43%		41%	
Shots wide	259	4,5	328	5,1	287	4,6	262	4,6
Blocked shots	256	4,5	253	4	207	3,3	217	3,8
Shots on post / bar	19	0,33	22	0,34	21	0,34	19	0,33
Goals - Free-kick attack	3	0,05	3	0,05	1	0,02	1	0,02
% scored free kick shots	67%		71%		83%		96%	
Penalties	12	12	17	17	18	18	23	23
Penalties scored	8	0,14	12	0,19	15	0,24	22	0,39
Penalties scored, %	67%		71%		83%		96%	
<b>Goals</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>1,96</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>2,1</b>

<b>MIX AND INDEXES</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
Total actions	60102	1054	62170	971	59570	961	57288	1005
Successful actions	47374	831	50006	781	48103	776	46550	817
Successful actions, %	79%		80%		81%		81%	
Challenges	10396	182	10304	161	9300	150	8374	147
Challenges won	5263	92	5230	82	4677	75	4249	75
Challenges won, %	51%		51%		50%		51%	
xG (Expected goals)	62,8	1,65	73,68	1,94	69,77	1,84	68,4	1,8
xG conversion	1		2,3		1,21		1	
xG per shot	0,133		0,133		0,111		0,114	
xG per goal	1		0,44		0,83		1	

- **Manchester City 2016 – 2020**

The seasons as Citizens' head coach are confirmation of the Guardiola's possession style of play; the interesting factor is that he has been able to adapt his ideas of indirect play in a country where the historical direct style of play is a dogma.

<b>POSSESSION</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
Ball possession, sec	119600	2062	145877	2353	146421	2288	118231	2231
Ball possession, %	62%	62%	66%	66%	64%	64%	64%	64%
Ball possessions, quantity	6288	108	6518	105	6344	99	4885	92
Possessions' average time	19		22		23		24	
<b>Passes</b>	<b>36406</b>	<b>628</b>	<b>47339</b>	<b>764</b>	<b>45719</b>	<b>714</b>	<b>37649</b>	<b>710</b>
<b>Accurate passes</b>	<b>31571</b>	<b>544</b>	<b>42283</b>	<b>682</b>	<b>40782</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>33599</b>	<b>634</b>
Accurate passes, %	87%		89%		89%		89%	
<b>Key passes</b>	<b>1746</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1626</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1504</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1385</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Key passes accurate</b>	<b>886</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>833</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>837</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Key passes accuracy, %</b>	<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>54%</b>		<b>58%</b>	
Dribbles	1903	33	1881	30	1808	28	1335	25
Dribbles successful	1142	20	1110	18	1042	16	781	15
Successful dribbles, %	60%		59%		58%		59%	

The passes per game have increased significantly through Pep's 4 years in charge (from 628 to 710) even if there decreasing from 2017/2018 (764 > 714 > 710) due to the higher and higher pressure of the opposition. Indeed, key passes have decreased, but on the other side, the accuracy is the same through the years and the percentage of these kind of passes have considerably increased from 50% to 58% and it's the proof of how Pep Guardiola is not a "dogma coach", but he can adapt his beliefs to his players skills, to the opponents and the league.

The first season 2016/2017 has been an adaptation year for Pep, and he understood the players who were right for him and the needed market transfer to improve his style of play. The number and loss of possessions have definitely decreased from the first season to the this current one.

Lost balls	4582	79	3633	59	3886	61	3076	58
Lost balls in own half	988	17	562	9	641	10	450	8

The lost ball have decreased of 21 per game in general and furthermore, the losses of possession have decreased inside the own half, proving that the build up from the back and the playing out sequences have been improved and made safe and efficient. The real trouble of this last season, is the defensive phase and the 9 defeats suffered (many of them against medium level teams - 33 played game so far) that placed Man City 2<sup>nd</sup> and 23 points behind Liverpool.

This last season can't delete the previous two and what Pep Guardiola has done to make City one of the most successful teams in England of the last years (not yet in Europe, where City hasn't a big history at the moment

The attacking challenges have decreased year by year; but if this data of the last two seasons were the proofs of the possession style of play adaptation (an indirect style of play adapting to a direct soccer League), the further decrease of this current season is the result of an increasing and stronger opposition's pressure; otherwise, the efficacy is always the same through the years (46% for 3 seasons in a row).

TYPES OF ATTACKS								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
<b>Attacking challenges</b>	<b>4582</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>4381</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>4250</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>3345</b>	<b>63</b>
Attacking challenges won	2189	38	2000	32	1952	31	1546	29
Challenges in attack / won, %	48%		46%		46%		46%	
<b>Positional attacks</b>	<b>4081</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>4551</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4479</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>3592</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Positional attacks with a shot</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>652</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>11</b>
% of efficiency for positional attacks	12%		13%		15%		16%	
<b>Counter-attacks</b>	<b>925</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>790</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>716</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>512</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Counter-attacks with a shot</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>2,6</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>2,1</b>
% of efficiency for counterattacks	17%		19%		23%		22%	
Set pieces attacks	561	10	647	10	650	10	528	10
Attacks with shots - Set pieces attacks	204	3,5	242	3,9	221	3,5	198	3,7
% of efficiency for set-piece attacks	36%		37%		34%		38%	
Free-kick attacks	152	2,6	165	2,7	151	2,4	115	2,2
Free-kick attacks with shots	69	1,19	79	1,27	72	1,12	58	1,09
% of efficiency for free-kick attacks	-	-	48%		48%		50%	
Corners	385	7	461	7	474	7	390	7
Corner attacks	7	0,12	461	7	474	7	390	7
Corner attacks with shots	121	2,1	153	2,5	135	2,1	124	2,3
% of efficiency for corner attacks	1729%	1729%	33%		28%		32%	
Throw-in attacks	1	0,02	10	0,16	15	0,23	7	0,13
Throw-in attacks with shots	-	-	-	-	3	0,05	-	-
% of efficiency for throw-in attacks	-	-	-	-	20%		-	-
Free-kick shots	38	0,66	46	0,74	39	0,61	34	0,64

Confirming the “positional play” style of soccer, the positional attacks efficacy is increasing year by year (from 12% to 16%, with 10/11 shots per game in the last 3 seasons).

Counter-attacks are another point of growth; the average of the first season in charge was 2,7 attacks on the counter per game with 17% of efficiency; the average is decreasing season by season, but the efficiency is increasing seamless (2,7 > 17% - 2,5 > 19% - 2,6 > 23 - 2,1 > 22%).

<b>FINISHING</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
<b>Entrances on opponent's half</b>	<b>4059</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>4594</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>4632</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>3650</b>	<b>69</b>
Entrances on final third of opponent's half	2853	49	3311	53	3406	53	2750	52
Entrances to the opponent's box	1253	22	1462	24	1588	25	1321	25
<b>Left-side attacks</b>	<b>1651</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1896</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2038</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>1550</b>	<b>29</b>
Attacks with shots - left side	166	2,9	213	3,4	264	4,1	228	4,3
Efficiency for attacks through the left flank, %	10%		11%		13%		15%	
<b>Attacks - center</b>	<b>1633</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1603</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1475</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1162</b>	<b>22</b>
Attacks with shots - center	264	4,6	298	4,8	294	4,6	213	4
Efficiency for attacks through the central zone, %	16%		19%		20%		18%	
<b>Attacks - right side</b>	<b>1722</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1842</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1682</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1392</b>	<b>26</b>
Attacks with shots - right side	182	3,1	215	3,5	239	3,7	213	4
Efficiency for attacks through the right flank, %	11%		12%		14%		15%	
Crosses	646	11	765	12	968	15	882	17
Crosses accurate	153	2,6	185	3	184	2,9	217	4,1
Accurate crosses, %	24%		24%		19%		25%	
<b>Chances</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>5,3</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>533</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Chances successful</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>2,8</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>2,6</b>
<b>Chances, % of conversion</b>	<b>24%</b>		<b>27%</b>		<b>32%</b>		<b>26%</b>	

Talking about the chances, the real attacking issue for City during this current season is the conversion percentage which is 6% less than the previous season (the best one among the 4). There is an essential development from the first year, but a lower percentage in relation to the previous one; Man City creates less chances than last 2 seasons and the conversion percentage of these chances is even lower and only a bit better than the first season.

The average of entrances into the opposition half is lower than the first season (69 against 70) and all the average of the attacking sides are lower than the previous seasons but the left one that is better than 2016/2017 (Sanè, Bernardo Silva, Zinchenko and Mahrez are giving a great contribution to this statistics) but worse than 2017/2018 and 2018/2019.

The efficiency of the attacking entrances along the flank has been improved, as well as the one through the center, but the chances conversion are decreased; this means that the opponents are more

efficient and they now know better than before where Manchester City usually try to finish the offensive phases.

<b>SHOOTING ON GOAL</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
<b>Shots</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1040</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1101</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Shots on target</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>5,7</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>7</b>
Shots on target, %	39%		40%		43%		42%	
Shots wide	290	5	341	5,5	325	5,1	277	5,2
Blocked shots	193	3,3	261	4,2	282	4,4	225	4,3
Shots on post / bar	25	0,43	23	0,37	25	0,39	29	0,55
Goals - Free-kick attack	3	0,05	3	0,05	4	0,06	3	0,06
<b>% scored free kick shots</b>	<b>71%</b>		<b>79%</b>		<b>74%</b>		<b>65%</b>	
Penalties	14	14	14	14	19	19	26	26
Penalties scored	10	0,17	11	0,18	14	0,22	17	0,32
Penalties scored, %	71%		79%		74%		65%	
Goals	122	2,1	153	2,5	173	2,7	134	2,5

The average of shots per game and of shots on target per game is the same since 2017/2018 (7); but the number of scored goals is just a bit better than 2016/2017 (134 so far against 122) and much worse than the two previous winning seasons (153 in 2017/2018 and 173 in 2018/2019).

Another issue for City during the while last and current season are the shots from free kicks (direct shots or after the second times of the ball); the actual 65% is even less than the first season percentage (71%) and much more less than 2017/2018 (79%) and 2018/2019 (74%).

<b>MIX AND INDEXES</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
Total actions	59553	1027	68687	1108	66613	1041	53992	1019
Successful actions	47455	818	57633	930	56077	876	45513	859
Successful actions, %	80%	80%	84%	84%	84%	84%	84%	84%
Challenges	2501	43	2175	35	2102	33	1612	30
Challenges won	1320	23	1182	19	1128	18	840	16
Challenges won, %	53%	53%	54%	54%	54%	54%	52%	52%
xG (Expected goals)								
xG conversion	-	-	2,3	2,3	1,19	1,19	0,97	0,97
xG per shot	-	-	0,47	0,47	0,15	0,15	0,15	0,15
xG per goal	-	-	0,23	0,23	1,1	1,1	1,04	1,04



- **Liverpool vs Manchester City Comparison 2016 – 2020**

<b>LIVERPOOL'S POSSESSION</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
Ball possession, sec	118128	2072	130517	2039	125285	2021	120804	2119
<b>Ball possession, %</b>	<b>61%</b>		<b>58%</b>		<b>59%</b>		<b>61%</b>	
Ball possessions, quantity	6378	112	6825	107	6686	108	6117	107
<b>Possessions' average time</b>	<b>19</b>		<b>19</b>		<b>19</b>		<b>20</b>	
Passes	36471	640	39240	613	39293	634	38562	677
Accurate passes	31424	551	33576	525	33678	543	33165	582
<b>Accurate passes, %</b>	<b>86%</b>		<b>86%</b>		<b>86%</b>		<b>86%</b>	
Key passes	1486	26	1526	24	1345	22	1169	21
Key passes accurate	760	13	750	12	701	11	599	11
<b>Key passes accuracy %</b>	<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>52%</b>	
Dribbles	1899	33	1876	29	1626	26	1423	25
Dribbles successful	1088	19	1080	17	900	15	779	14
<b>Successful dribbles, %</b>	<b>57%</b>		<b>58%</b>		<b>55%</b>		<b>55%</b>	

<b>MANCHESTER CITY'S POSSESSION</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
Ball possession, sec	119600	2062	145877	2353	146421	2288	118231	2231
<b>Ball possession, %</b>	<b>62%</b>		<b>66%</b>		<b>64%</b>		<b>64%</b>	
Ball possessions, quantity	6288	108	6518	105	6344	99	4885	92
<b>Possessions' average time</b>	<b>19</b>		<b>22</b>		<b>23</b>		<b>24</b>	
Passes	36406	628	47339	764	45719	714	37649	710
Accurate passes	31571	544	42283	682	40782	637	33599	634
<b>Accurate passes, %</b>	<b>87%</b>		<b>89%</b>		<b>89%</b>		<b>89%</b>	
Key passes	1746	30	1626	26	1504	24	1385	26
Key passes accurate	886	15	833	13	837	13	771	15
<b>Key passes accuracy, %</b>	<b>50%</b>		<b>50%</b>		<b>54%</b>		<b>58%</b>	
Dribbles	1903	33	1881	30	1808	28	1335	25
Dribbles successful	1142	20	1110	18	1042	16	781	15
<b>Successful dribbles, %</b>	<b>60%</b>		<b>59%</b>		<b>58%</b>		<b>59%</b>	

From 2016/2017 Manchester City has always been better than Liverpool from possession point of view and Guardiola's team improved the all the averages more than the Reds, and this was enough to win 2 English Premier League in a row (2017/2018 and 2018/2019).

On the other side, Liverpool improved itself as a team and the quality of the possession phases, fixing the main issue of the seasons as underdog; the ball losses' average per match. Liverpool has raised up in the table, from the 4<sup>th</sup> (2016/2017) to the 1<sup>st</sup> (2019/2020) place in 3 years thanks to a better defensive phase and a more solid possession phase.

Guardiola has developed his possession style of play, Klopp has created a solid perfect safe possession machine during these 4 years.

<b>LIVERPOOL'S TYPES OF ATTACKS</b>								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
<b>Attacking challenges</b>	<b>5164</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>5123</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>4550</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4186</b>	<b>73</b>
Attacking challenges won	2339	41	2299	36	1972	32	1835	32
<b>Challenges in attack / won, %</b>	<b>45%</b>		<b>45%</b>		<b>43%</b>		<b>44%</b>	
<b>Positional attacks</b>	<b>4331</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>4410</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>4214</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>4092</b>	<b>72</b>
<b>Positional attacks with a shot</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>486</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>480</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>% of efficiency for positional attacks</b>	<b>12%</b>		<b>13%</b>		<b>12%</b>		<b>12%</b>	
Counter-attacks	901	16	1062	17	899	15	735	13
Counter-attacks with a shot	158	2,8	213	3,3	155	2,5	142	2,5
<b>% of efficiency for counterattacks</b>	<b>18%</b>		<b>20%</b>		<b>17%</b>		<b>19%</b>	

<b>MANCHESTER CITY'S TYPES OF ATTACKS</b>								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
<b>Attacking challenges</b>	<b>4582</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>4381</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>4250</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>3345</b>	<b>63</b>
Attacking challenges won	2189	38	2000	32	1952	31	1546	29
<b>Challenges in attack / won, %</b>	<b>48%</b>		<b>46%</b>		<b>46%</b>		<b>46%</b>	
<b>Positional attacks</b>	<b>4081</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>4551</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>4479</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>3592</b>	<b>68</b>
<b>Positional attacks with a shot</b>	<b>471</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>652</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>564</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>% of efficiency for positional attacks</b>	<b>12%</b>		<b>13%</b>		<b>15%</b>		<b>16%</b>	
Counter-attacks	925	16	790	13	716	11	512	10
Counter-attacks with a shot	154	2,7	153	2,5	167	2,6	113	2,1
<b>% of efficiency for counterattacks</b>	<b>17%</b>		<b>19%</b>		<b>23%</b>		<b>22%</b>	

Liverpool's change of style becomes clear from the average per match of the attacking challenges (73 against the 91 of the 2016/2017 season). Manchester City has had a similar decrease through the years, but it seems to be forced by the deeper defensive lines of the opponents; indeed, Citizens' positional attacks have decreased a bit through the years even if the efficiency of these attacks have increased thanks to Guardiola's work (from 12% to 16% per game). Liverpool positional play has remained at the same levels during the seasons, and the lower number of ball's losses made it more effective. At the same time the number of positional attacks has decreased for City as to develop its style of play has become harder this season due to oppositions' adaptations of the defensive phase, but it still maintain the efficacy of the previous season (16 against 15 per game) and also improve it in relation to 2017/2018 season (16 against 13). Talking about counter attacks, Liverpool's efficacy has come back to the Klopp's third season in charge, when Klopp was still creating the "Winning Liverpool" despite the decreased number of counter-attacks per game (from 17 to 13 with percentage of efficacy of 20% and 19%). Talking about City, the difference about counter-attacks is unbelievable; 6 counter-attacks less per game and an increase of 6% (2018/2019) and 5% (2019/2020) in relation to 2016/2017.

Liverpool and Manchester City are “crossing teams.”

LIVERPOOL'S FINISHING								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
Entrances on opponent's half	4147	73	4314	67	4308	69	4113	72
Entrances on final third of opponent's half	2868	50	3027	47	2967	48	2900	51
Entrances to the opponent's box	1202	21	1396	22	1322	21	1207	21
<b>Left-side attacks</b>	<b>1776</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>1696</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1665</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1580</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the left flank, %</b>	<b>10%</b>		<b>12%</b>		<b>10%</b>		<b>12%</b>	
<b>Attacks - center</b>	<b>1680</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>1697</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1388</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>1230</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the central zone, %</b>	<b>18%</b>		<b>20%</b>		<b>17%</b>		<b>15%</b>	
<b>Attacks - right side</b>	<b>1776</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2079</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>2060</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the right flank, %</b>	<b>12%</b>		<b>11%</b>		<b>11%</b>		<b>12%</b>	
<b>Crosses</b>	<b>712</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>848</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>994</b>	<b>17</b>
Accurate crosses, %	29%		26%		25%		23%	
<b>Chances</b>	<b>275</b>	<b>4,8</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>432</b>	<b>8</b>
Chances successful	106	1,86	158	2,5	146	2,4	121	2,1
<b>Chances, % of conversion</b>	<b>24%</b>		<b>29%</b>		<b>32%</b>		<b>28%</b>	

MANCHESTER CITY'S FINISHING								
	2016-2017 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2017-2018 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2018-2019 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH	2019-2020 (TOTAL)	AV. PER MATCH
Entrances on opponent's half	4059	70	4594	74	4632	72	3650	69
Entrances on final third of opponent's half	2853	49	3311	53	3406	53	2750	52
Entrances to the opponent's box	1253	22	1462	24	1588	25	1321	25
<b>Left-side attacks</b>	<b>1651</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1896</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2038</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>1550</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the left flank, %</b>	<b>10%</b>		<b>11%</b>		<b>13%</b>		<b>15%</b>	
<b>Attacks - center</b>	<b>1633</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>1603</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1475</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>1162</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the central zone, %</b>	<b>16%</b>		<b>19%</b>		<b>20%</b>		<b>18%</b>	
<b>Attacks - right side</b>	<b>1722</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1842</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>1682</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>1392</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>Efficiency for attacks through the right flank, %</b>	<b>11%</b>		<b>12%</b>		<b>14%</b>		<b>15%</b>	
<b>Crosses</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>968</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>882</b>	<b>17</b>
Accurate crosses, %	24%		24%		19%		25%	
<b>Chances</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>5,3</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>533</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>8</b>
Chances successful	118	2	154	2,5	176	2,8	135	2,6
<b>Chances, % of conversion</b>	<b>24%</b>		<b>27%</b>		<b>32%</b>		<b>26%</b>	

The first common point between Liverpool and Manchester City that can be highlighted is the tendency to be “crossing teams”, despite Klopp and Guardiola use the flanks in two different ways.

The Reds develop their patterns of play along the flanks from the first third to the final third, the center spaces of the first third and of the middle third are used to switch the side, both while building up from the back and when the possession phase is being carried out in the middle third and the center space of the final third (zone 14) is the zone where the wide strikers (Manè and Salah) move off and with the ball to find the space to shot on goal.

On the other side, Guardiola’s Citizens tendency is to develop the building up and the possession phases in the first and middle third through the center, thanks to the inverted fullbacks, to invite the opponents to condense their defensive shape there to be free the wingers along the flanks in the final third; the 1-2-3-5 attacking shape is one of the new and recurrent tactical situation that Premier League is watching since 3 seasons.

Whatever is the idea behind the use of the flanks, Liverpool has increased the average number of crosses with 5 more in relation to the 2016/2017 season, since Alexander Arnold and Robertson have joined the team. The same increasing tendency can be found in Manchester City (6 crosses per game more than in 2016/2017).

The main difference is the type of crosses; Liverpool prefers long crosses into the box for the forwards and the incoming midfielders, Man City usually plays short cross toward the 6 yds. opposition’s box (near goal’s post).

For both teams, the attack through the center are decisively decreasing since 2016/2017 and have increased the chance almost twice.

Liverpool tends to cross from the right flank and to dribble the ball up along the left wing; Man City is a left wing oriented team, as the usual inverted fullback is Walker (the Rfb), after Delph has been sold.

As the opponents tend to defend deeper against them, the chances of conversion to shot on goal of the attacking moves have decreased, much more for City than Liverpool; this is one of the main issues for Guardiola’s team during this season.

<b>LIVERPOOL'S SHOOTING ON GOAL</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
<b>Shots</b>	<b>871</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>1024</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>902</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>851</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Shots on target</b>	<b>337</b>	<b>5,9</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>387</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>6</b>
Shots on target, %	39%		41%		43%		41%	
Shots wide	259	4,5	328	5,1	287	4,6	262	4,6
Blocked shots	256	4,5	253	4	207	3,3	217	3,8
Shots on post / bar	19	0,33	22	0,34	21	0,34	19	0,33
Goals - Free-kick attack	3	0,05	3	0,05	1	0,02	1	0,02
<b>% scored free kick shots</b>	<b>67%</b>		<b>71%</b>		<b>83%</b>		<b>96%</b>	
Penalties	12	12	17	17	18	18	23	23
Penalties scored	8	0,14	12	0,19	15	0,24	22	0,39
Penalties scored, %	67%		71%		83%		96%	
<b>Goals</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>1,96</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>2,4</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>2,3</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>2,1</b>

<b>MANCHESTER CITY'S SHOOTING ON GOAL</b>								
	<b>2016-2017 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2017-2018 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2018-2019 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>	<b>2019-2020 (TOTAL)</b>	<b>AV. PER MATCH</b>
<b>Shots</b>	<b>838</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>1040</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>1101</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Shots on target</b>	<b>330</b>	<b>5,7</b>	<b>415</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>469</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>391</b>	<b>7</b>
Shots on target, %	39%		40%		43%		42%	
Shots wide	290	5	341	5,5	325	5,1	277	5,2
Blocked shots	193	3,3	261	4,2	282	4,4	225	4,3
Shots on post / bar	25	0,43	23	0,37	25	0,39	29	0,55
Goals - Free-kick attack	3	0,05	3	0,05	4	0,06	3	0,06
<b>% scored free kick shots</b>	<b>71%</b>		<b>79%</b>		<b>74%</b>		<b>65%</b>	
Penalties	14	14	14	14	19	19	26	26
Penalties scored	10	0,17	11	0,18	14	0,22	17	0,32
Penalties scored, %	71%		79%		74%		65%	
<b>Goals</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>2,1</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>2,5</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>2,7</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>2,5</b>

The first very clear factor is the decreasing number of goals for both teams comparing this current season with the previous two; but if for Liverpool it is linked to best defensive stats since Klopp is in charge, it is the contrary for Man City that conceded many more goals than the previous winning seasons, scoring almost 30 goals less so far (City is still on the run to be Fa Cup, League Cup and Champion League winners; Liverpool's season is finished the Premier League 2019/2020 title.


## Liverpool attacking tactical evolution

- 2015/16

When Klopp was initially appointed in October 2015, he quickly did away with Brendan Rodgers' favored 3-5-2 and installed his own preferred 4-2-3-1 until the end of the 2015/16 season. Liverpool was the Europa League Cup Final runner up. The 3 conceded goals due to a lack of defensive pressure between the wide advanced midfielders and the fullbacks that invited the opponent up in the field during the final convinced Klopp to change the system of play for the next season into the 1-4-3-3.



[This is the starting sequence of Sevilla's draw goal; the center midfielders are very close to the defensive line and Liverpool has created a strong side on the right side. The 3 advanced midfielders are also much closer to the center midfielders and they are creating a condensed area around the ball; furthermore there is a big gap along the defensive left side that Sevilla's right fullback can exploit].



He can receive the switch of side and the Reds' left attacking midfielder is forced to retreat back quickly. This way, the ball carrier can attack the depth along the flank dribbling the ball up without pressure.

2016/17

First of all, Klopp gave the team a system, and certainties to players. Across the 2016/17 season, the first one with the German and the Catalan coaches one against the other, Klopp's mark became more recognizable. Gini Wijnaldum, Joel Matip, Loris Karius and Sadio Manè were added over the summer.

Firmino was the team's new No.9, showcasing a tendency to drop back into midfield due to the shuttler trio which gave the forwards fewer defensive responsibilities.



[In this sequence Firmino acts as target player with his back to the opposition's goal; he makes the possession safe, invite the pressure of the direct marker, who moves out of position. The right and center midfielders, Lallana and Coutinho don't move in behind the defensive line, but they stand around the ball position to combine].



[Firmino sets the ball on Lallana's forward run and Coutinho moves again to be a short passing option, rather than moving in behind off the ball].

Manè offered a penetrative threat in behind opposing defenses thanks to his speed (Sturridge, Firmino, Lallana and Phillipe Coutinho offered passing options by coming short.)



[Indeed, the only player who moves in behind the opposition's defensive line is Manè].

The wide midfielders started to help the fullbacks during the defensive phases, and this is one of the major tactical innovations that would have been decisive in the next seasons.



**(footage from 2017/2018 season.)**

[This exchange of positions is one of the real landmarks of the reds, since the fullbacks are play making and attacking weapons along the flanks; when a fullback moves or dribble the ball up in the field, the linked midfielder along the same side drops back to cover the position. Robertson is dribbling the ball up and Milner drops back, in this example].



The league season ended with Klopp's men winning 22 of their 38 league matches - a stark improvement on his first season, albeit with the caveat of him taking charge of eight more fixtures. 2017/18

During summer Liverpool signed Andy Robertson, Mohamed Salah and Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain, with Trent Alexander-Arnold's rise into the first-team. The fullback started to be playmakers, filling the lack of creative passers in the midfield, also due to Oxlade-Chamberlain injury during that season. Liverpool had a new dynamic in attack, as Salah's arrival permitted Mane to move over to the left flank, where he was able to cut inside regularly onto his favored foot. Firmino complemented the pair perfectly, by operating in a central position and regularly withdrawing himself from the areas in which Mane and Salah wished to sprint into from the flanks, providing the opposition with two constant problems to solve as a result of Firmino's tendency to drop off, combined with Salah and Mane's preference to run in behind.



[Firmino acts again as target player, dropping back to receive, in this sequence of a match against Manchester City. He takes advantage of the wrong position of the direct marker and he can turn toward the opposition goal].



[This is the main different in relation to the previous 2016/2017 season, after Salah signing; when Firmino can control the ball, turn and play toward the opposition's goal, 2 attackers runs in behind the opposition's defensive line, after Coutinho's sale to Barcelona].




[The first one, Manè attacks the pass and the second one Salah can try to finish after a quick combination. It was difficult to see attacking patterns of play like this during the previous season].

Around the Christmas period, Klopp formed his new defense. Robertson displaced Moreno as the team's first-choice left-back, and Virgil van Dijk was signed in January from Southampton for a world-record fee. The impact of the duo on Liverpool's defense proved telling. From the beginning of the season until the end of December, Liverpool conceded 24 league goals. However after the turn of the year, following the introduction of both players into the defensive line, the Reds conceded just 13 league goals; but after the Coutinho's sale, the Reds suffered poor performances due to a lack of creativity in the final third; from this issue, Klopp created his tactical masterpiece; the "playmakers fullbacks, which would have become the landmark of his Liverpool.

Despite the improved performances over the Home and European campaigns, Klopp's men won 22 league matches which was one game fewer than the season before and subsequently meant they couldn't better their fourth placed finish and they remained trophy less once again following their 3-1 defeat to Real Madrid in the UCL final. But from then on, they started to have performances, and they just needed the results.

- 2018/2019

Enter Alisson Becker, Nabi Keita, Fabinho and Shaqiri were signed in the summer, the recruits that Klopp required in order to introduce a more controlling version of his energetic, emotional football. Pep Lijnders referenced, when asked to describe Liverpool's development in 2018/19: “The Reds had retained the core principles of their volatile, intense, unpredictable football, but had progressed onto a new level by integrating an authoritative dimension to their play, with opposing teams simply struggling to cope with the tempo showcased”. In addition, with Robertson now established as a starter and Alexander-Arnold's rise, they became Liverpool's primary means of creativity and ball progression, with the midfield remaining largely industrious. Balance had been integrated into the side. The introduction of Robertson and Alexander-Arnold changed that, though, and once the 2018/19 Premier League season had been concluded, the latter ended the campaign with the most assists ever recorded by a defender with 12, with the former following close behind on 11.



[Arnold, the right fullback receives a through pass from Henderson in behind, moving off the ball along the forward's line].



The pass and the reception cut the defenders off and allow the fullback to drive a ground cross pass through the space between the opposition's defensive line and the goalkeeper.



[Firmino can score in front of the goal without pressure].

This next sequence is another example of assist from the left fullback Robertson, who is already standing inside the opposition's 18 yds. box and plays a second shorter cross pass in front of the goal's space.



[Oxlade-Chamberlain plays a cross pass inside the 18 yds. box from a deep position along the flank, exploiting the pressure of 3 opposition's defenders, who, however, don't try to tackle him, giving time and space to play.

But at first, none of Liverpool's forwards is standing in front of the opposition's goal and the cross pass is driven toward the goal's far post].



[Robertson, the left fullback has followed the move along the opposite flank, and he is already standing inside the opposition box along the same line of the forwards (Firmino and Salah); he drives a second one touch cross pass through the path that the defenders are leaving between the last line in

front of the goal and the holding midfielder (they are covering the goal space rather than marking the opponents. This way, they can attack the space in front of them and meet the ball].




[Salah meets the ball along the line of the goal’s far post in relation to the second cross pass and he scores with a cross shot, wronging-foot the goalkeeper]. All of the above accumulated in Liverpool securing their highest ever Premier League points tally at 97, winning a much improved 30 league matches and just one league defeat, but seating second (1 point behind Manchester City.)



Recognizing data	1 > Goal vs Xg p90	2 > Goal vs Xg conceded p 90	3 > Shots on goal p90	4 > Shots conceded p90	5 > Shots medium distance	6 > Shots on goal	7 > Pass accuracy
8 > % long ball vs passes	9 > Positional attacks with shots	10 > Defensive duels won	11 > Counter-attacks p90	12 > Smart passes p90	13 > Positional attacks	14 > Passes p90	15 > Passes per possession

Reds took the scalps of the Champions of France, Portugal, Germany and Spain all on the way to the UCL Madrid's final against Tottenham and to eventually lift the trophy.



Klopp's system had become highly functional, during this season, with creativity and risk-taking in wide areas, defensive assurance and physicality in central areas, and unpredictability in attack. 2019/2020




Jürgen Klopp's phenomenal impact on the club has understandably been much heralded, but what has gone largely unmentioned is how he has ushered in a tactical revolution at the very top of the game, potentially changing the way football is played forever. Liverpool have 13 more points than you would normally expect based on their goal difference, based on historical data. That could be seen as a team performing above its level, and there may be a small element of that, but in Liverpool's case there are definitive explanations for their extraordinary dominance.

The control that Klopp's Liverpool have on matches is rarely seen more clearly than after the team have taken an early lead. That seems to occur with unusual frequency, but it's part of a clear strategy. No team in the division starts at such a tempo and with such attacking intent, with Liverpool targeting the start of the game as an opportunity to expose opponents. As a result, no team in the league has scored more goals in the opening 15 minutes of matches this season, and no team in the league has scored more first-half goals in total. There is a narrative around Liverpool that 'Kloppage Time' has become the new 'Fergie Time'. Yet while Liverpool do score a decent number of late goals (more on that later), it is interesting to note that as a team they score more first-half goals than second-half goals – a stat that very much goes against the historical trend. When they get that early lead Liverpool



are then in a position to sit back, shield the defense well to hold onto their advantage, and force teams to come out and attack them more than they would have planned. Ergo, Liverpool have taken control of the game. Their reputation is of high-tempo counter-pressing with attacking intent... but their reputation is now also of possession based along the flanks and counter-attacking football team with a dangerous front-three. In Liverpool's case both of those are true, it just depends what the score line is.

Where Klopp has potentially changed the direction of modern football is in his use of the midfield. Liverpool's possession statistics, while not at Guardiola levels, are high, however his team fundamentally does not totally control the possession, but when they are leading the match, or create changes through the midfield route.

Klopp instead uses his midfield to set that early tempo, implement that pressing game, and shut down space for opposition teams to play in. For this to be successful it takes a great deal of motivation, and also a very high amount of energy – hence the extremely high rotation of minutes among Liverpool's midfielders. Only three players will start in these roles, the most familiar being Gigi Wijnaldum, Jordan Henderson and Fabinho. However, Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain has played well over 1000 minutes and made more appearances than the Brazilian, James Milner isn't far behind, and even the injury-impacted Naby Keita is into double figures for league games played this season.

Player	Playing time (Premier League)	Gps field coverage
Jordan Henderson	2243'	
Georgino Wijnaldum	2628'	
Fabinho	1804'	



Alex Oxlade-Chamberlain	1340'	
James Milner	811'	
Keïta Naby Deco	613'	



Klopp has pushed even more focus on to the full-backs in his Liverpool side, using the two players on the pitch who are most often going to be the spare man as an opportunity to create. The Premier League individual possession statistics make for fascinating reading in this regard. Second in that list is Virgil van Dijk, who anchors Liverpool's play, is an out-ball for goalkeeper and midfielders, and is utilized to switch the play. But Liverpool take all three podium spots in that statistic, with Trent Alexander-Arnold and Andy Robertson making up the rest of the top three, with the Englishman leading the way.







Rank	Player	Total played passes	Position	Team
1	Virgil Van Dijk	2619	LCB	Liverpool
2	T. A. Arnold	2351	RB	Liverpool
3	Rodri Hernández	2215	DMF, RCMF, LDMF	Man. City
4	A. Robertson	2162	LB	Liverpool

It's no secret that Liverpool use their full-backs as creators, but the extent to which they do so is stark. The pair are Liverpool's top assisters this season, both are in the league's top five, and they are the only full-backs in the league's top ten for assists.

Rank	Player	Total	Position	Team
1	K. De Bruyne	17	RCMF, AMF	Man City
2	<b>T. A. Arnold</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>RB</b>	<b>Liverpool</b>
3	Adama Traoré	9	RWF, RWB, RW	Wolverhampton
4	<b>A. Robertson</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>LB</b>	<b>Liverpool</b>
5	David Silva	8	LCMF, AMF	Man City
6	R. Mahrez	8	RWF, RAMF, RW	Man City
7	H. Barnes	7	LW, LWF	Leicester City
8	Roberto Firmino	7	CF, AMF	Liverpool
9	Bernardo Silva	7	RWF, LWF, RAMF	Man City
10	Heung-Min Son	7	LAMF, LW, CF	Tottenham


At Liverpool, 91% of chances creation this season has come from the full-backs and the front three. That is a higher number than any other team across Europe's big five leagues from any of the past five seasons. It is a stat which lays out the reality perfectly – this is a team that has changed the approach for creating chances. For now it's a style that the other Premier League teams can't cope with. Whether it turns into the new normal remains to be seen.

Player	Appearances and time on the field	Gps field coverage
<b>T. A. Arnold</b>	<p><b>Premier League:</b> 35 appearances 2992' played</p> <p><b>UEFA Champions League:</b> 7 appearances 582'</p>	
<b>A. Robertson</b>	<p><b>Premier League:</b> 33 appearances 2847' played</p> <p><b>FA Cup:</b> 1 appearance 90' played</p> <p><b>UEFA Champions League:</b> 8 appearance 648'</p>	


<p><b>Mohamed Salah</b></p>		
<p><b>Roberto Firmino</b></p>		
<p><b>Sadio Manè</b></p>		

The next diagrams are examples of the passing sequences and directions to understand how the players are perfectly linked among them all over the field.

- The first one analyzes the home Premier League match against Arsenal last August 2019.
- The second one takes a look to the Premier League match against Chelsea last September 2020.



Liverpool stand high in the field and the center spaces are used to switch the side and move the opposition. Reds could build up the attacking moves much higher on the field, due to deep Arsenal's defensive shape.



In this second example Liverpool has built up more from the back with more combinations in the middle third before playing through passes toward the forwards in the final third.

## Manchester City attacking tactical evolution (2016 – 2020)

- **2016/17**

Before Pep Guardiola arrival in 2016/2017, Manchester City has had three successful seasons with Manuel Pellegrini (1 Premier League 2013/2014, 2 League Cup 2013/2014 and 2015/2016) in and a UCL semifinal), despite tactical issues due to a constant system of play which was not improved through the years.

The only change had been to turn from the 1-4-4-2 to the 1-4-2-3-1 during last season, but poor results from possession and balance points of view:



[When the usual interchanges of positions between Silva and De Bruyne didn't work, the possession phase of the Citizens were blocked down the wing, where Pellegrini asked the Belgian to play, despite his preference to be free to act both centrally and wide. A 3 v 2 duel for the opposition is clear, in this situation].



When De Bruyne acted too centrally, the 1-4-2-3-1, in which he should have been the wide advanced midfielder on the right, there wasn't any wide support solution if he was carrying the ball in the middle third.

From a defensive point of view, the center midfielders of this system of play (usually Yaya Tourè and Fernandinho, sometimes Fernando), left space in between the lines, when none of them dropped back in front of the defensive line.



[Tourè tries to stop the opposition No.10 action, and he should prevent him from turning with the ball].



[The second center midfielder, Fernandinho is too far from the ball position, and the opposition's ball carrier has space and time on the ball to play a through pass at the back of the defensive line.

Furthermore, the defenders are too far from one another and they leaves gaps and paths toward the goal].

Pellegrini quit was announced after 23 games, with Manchester City 2<sup>nd</sup> in the table, 3 points behind Leicester (44 against 47), and in the last 15 matches, the Citizens only gained 22 points and finished 4<sup>th</sup>.

Meanwhile, Pep Guardiola was finishing his 3 years contract as Bayern Munich Head Coach, with trophies, but losing 3 UCL semifinal in a row and he didn't renew his agreement with the German club due to market argues also.



At the time, Ferran Soriano (Ceo) and Xiki Beguiristain (Football Director), 2 top Managers who already working with Pep Guardiola at Barcelona, and they decided to sign the Catalan coach to develop the style of play of the club. The main doubts about his arrival were about the system of play to work in a direct attacking style of play like EPL and if an old age squad could follow him 100%; other questions were about if the quality of some players could fit his plans (Bony, who was not technically gifted, Hart and Mangala who were not used to build up from the back and Tourè and Nasri , who had not a specific position for Pep's plan. During the 2016 summer, City signed new players on the coach's demand: Claudio Bravo, from Barcelona, John Stones from Everton, Zichenko, Ilkay Gundogan from BVB, Leroy Sanè from Schalke 04, Nolito from Celta Vigo and Gabriel Jesus from Palmeiras, spending £ 164 mln. At the same time Managala, Jovetic, Navas, De Michelis, Nasri, Hart and Bony were sold, left free or on loan for the next season.

The main issue of the first season in charge at the Ethiad Stadium have been to find a real starting XI, and Guardiola used more than 8 types of different formations in 38 matches; the 1-4-3-3, which was the main system of play that season usually often become a 1-4-1-4-1 with De Bruyne and Silva pushing high and close to the center forward



[Silva and De Bruyne are acting as 2 No.10 behind the forward's line that Aguero in the center, Sterling on the right and Sanè on the left are shaping].

The holding midfielder (Fernandinho or Yaya Tourè) dropped back into the center defenders and he was the one who usually played to the wingers together with Kolarov (the right center back).



[Claudio Bravo is playing a long pass with the hands, Yaya Tourè acts as advanced vertex of the building up triangle...



[...and he switches the side to the right, after a quick passing combination on the left, to invite the opposition toward a strong and condensed area around the ball....





[...freeing the right winger in the middle third near the side line]

Alexander Kolarov, as left center back, had also a peculiar role as left playmaker, serving long ball to Sanè and Sterling in the final third (he reached an average of 4,2 long passes per game (the highest in the team during that season).



[In this example, he is carrying the ball forward in the middle of the center cycle...]



...and he plays a diagonal long pass to the right, where the right winger can receive and face 1 v 1 the opposition's fullback, as the defensive shape has previously been condensed through the center].

During the first season, Pep Guardiola started also to plan the developments of two crucial tactical ideas for the incoming seasons: the inverted fullbacks and the movements with and without the ball along the half spaces.



[Yaya Touré has the ball and Kolarov, who is playing as left fullback, shifts across the center to support the possession phase and the teammate].

This second example is very explicative, as the left half space is overload and the right fullback is moving along the opposite one as inverted fullback.



[4 Citizens are forcing the opposition to overload the attacking left half space to create a 5 v 4 duel, and at the same time, Zabaleta, the right fullback is moving along the right half space as inverted fullback].

Sterling and Sanè gave an essential contribution to the final amount of scored goals and assists (5 goals and 3 assists the English player and 7 goals and 6 assists the German one).



[This is a typical recurrent attacking combination that could be noticed in the final third: Aguero, or the center forward, dropped back away from the opposition's defensive line, he played a 1-2

combination with the advanced midfielder, the winger cut inside to invite the direct marker, opening a space for the forward to receive...




...and the striker could then shot on goal or combine again with the winger to finish.

The main issues of the first trophy less season in charge were basically 3:

- Aguero had become an opposition “18 yds. box striker” rather than a “target forward” and he scored 3 goals less than expected.
- Manchester City aimed to congest the center and to open up spaces wide, but the Clichy and Sagnà were not good enough on the ball (the rhythm was very slow and pace and timing of the attacks were not quick enough; indeed, Kolarov had defensive troubles as inverted fullbacks).
- Claudio Bravo, the goalkeeper made mistakes all through the season, apart from good passing skills: he had conceded 7 goals more than expected.


Minutes played	Conceded goals	xCG
2865	34	27,47

Despite failing also cups' finals (1-0 to United in the League Cup quarter final, 2-1 to Arsenal in FA Cup semi-final and on away goals after a 6-6 to Monaco in UCL round of 16), and finishing 3<sup>rd</sup> in the EPL table with 78 points against the 86 Xpoints, there were improvements in relation to the previous seasons:



Man City scored more goals, improved the possession average per match, the number of passes per possession and per game and furthermore, De Bruyne finished the season with 18 assist. Vice versa, City won less point than expected in EPL.

	Goals	xG	Passes	accurate	Possession	Positional attacks	Deep completed passes	P.a./with shots
Man City under Pellegrini (2015/2016)	1.9	1.7	505.82	85.8%	53.1%	35.52	12.4	20.6%
Man City under Guardiola (2016/2017)	2,1	1,91	570,47	86,70%	62,18%	34,91	14,48	21,70%



This example of passing network, shows how the center space of the middle third was the heart of the team, but the team’s shape was not yet what Pep Guardiola was looking for; the fullbacks provided width, but to far away from the opposition’s goal; furthermore, the winger could touch the ball after too many combinations that allowed the opponent to drop deeper in front of the goal to save, making harder for City to find the way to the goal.

From Pep Guardiola point of view at that time, as he stated, the team needed to react to the bad moments, going on doing what they normally were used to do; the issues were tactical and about mentality also.

- **2017/2018**

During the summer, City was very busy in the market, signing Ederson, the new goalkeeper, from Benfica, Bernardo Silva and Mendy from Monaco, Danilo from Real Madrid, Walker from Tottenham and Laporte from Athletic Bilbao; Citizens spent £ 256 mln. On other side, many players were left free on loan or sold for few money to prepare the right squad for the coach (Nasri, Sagna, Clichy, Nolito, Kolarov, Ihenacho, Bony and others), realizing £ 52 mln of income.

Having 3 top fullbacks, Guardiola turned to the 1-3-5-2 system of play in for the very first matches of the season; the best example of Pep's idea under the incoming season had been a 5-0 won EPL match against Liverpool at Etihad Stadium, on 9 September 2017, when 3 out of the 5 goals came from the wings thanks to Mendy and Walker.



[De Bruyne underlaps in front of Mendy through the space between the opposition's fullback and center back; Walker, the right fullback is providing depth along the opposite flank to stretch the opposition's defensive line].



[Mendy receives along the side line of the box and the left winger Sanè runs off the ball at the back of the opposition's defensive line].

This last example is interesting, as this is also a decisive attacking tactic that would have taken Liverpool to win the Premier League after 30 years.




[Mendy plays a cross pass from the left flank toward the far post, but none of City's strikers can meet the ball].



[The right fullback, who is providing depth along the right flank, receives and passes to the left winger, who shifts across without pressure. Sanè can receive, turn and shoot on goal to the far post in relation to the ball position after the second ground cross pass.

After Mendy injury, Guardiola came back to the 1-4-3-3, with Laporte getting into the center back rotation, Walker as right fullback and Delph as left center back; at this point Sterling and Sanè became the right and the left wingers sideward to Aguero, and the 1-3-2-5 with alternate right and left inverted fullbacks shaped the attacking formation for most of the rest of the season:

Basically, the team shape of Citizens while building up can be considered as a 1-3-1 (+1 opposite inverted fullback).



[Otamendi has the ball, Stones is the second center back, Delph is providing width along the left flank and Walker shifts across to act as inverted fullback].




[In this second example, along the opposite right flank, the team shape is very clear: Ederson, the goalkeeper, Otamendi and Stones, the center are connected, shaping the line to play the ball out, Fernandinho provide center support and he acts as play maker (holding defensive midfielder in case of loss of possession and the opposite left fullback runs inside the half space to act as inverted fullback and to shape the couple of midfielders in front of the back three.



The goalkeeper is always the heart of the distribution phase for Pep Guardiola and this is the reason why the Catalan coach decided to sign Ederson after his first season at Etihad Stadium; despite Claudio Bravo did well from building up from the back, the Brazilian ensured more safety from goalkeeping point of view.




[Here again the same building up shape of the Citizens; Walker is touching the side line and he starts the distribution phase, Stones receives and Ederson switches the side to the left fullback, who is acting as inverted fullback along the left half space. Fernandinho is always a center support during this phase of play].



[Zinchenko dribbles the ball up along the half space, acting as second center midfielder beside Fernandinho and he switches the side again along the right flank toward the winger]. The midfield shape will be one of the crucial issues of this current 2019/2020 season for City.

The 2-3 attacking formation become recurrent and very recognizable during this season, with the advanced midfielders behind the forwards, the center striker and the wingers; at this time, the wingers were used to play along their foot's flank and as inverted wingers, as well.




[This is the usual attacking formation; David Silva on the left and Kevin De Bruyne on the right, Aguero or Gabriel Jesus as center striker, Sterling along the right flank and Sanè along the left one].




The attacking shape is decisive also for transitions and defensive phases; the attacking midfielders retreat back, the inverted fullback beside the holding midfielder and the 3 at the back ensure center defensive coverage to prevent the opposition from counter-attacking.

This way the overload of the center space was always the first aim of the transition to defend and the defensive phase.

As we found out, Fernandinho become the heart of the team during possession phases and his passing stats improved at the highest levels of his career. Here is an example of heat map of one of his matches:



And here is an example of passing network through the field: vertical and diagonal passes at the back and distribution passes in the middle third with through passes attempts.



Average stats of the EPL season:

<b>Passes</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>Forward passes</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>Back passes</b>	<b>acc.</b>	
82.91	91.9%	24.78	84.3%	10.13	97.4%	
<b>Long passes</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>Passes to final third</b>	<b>Through passes</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>To penalty area</b>	<b>acc.</b>
4.49	59.1%	13.95	1.84	33.3%	2.74	56.4%
<b>Crosses</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>Assists</b>	<b>xA</b>	<b>Second assists</b>	<b>acc.</b>	<b>Received passes</b>
0.44	40%	0.09	0.07	0.18	86.8%	68.23

The essential skill of Fernandinho is to understand where to find the right position to receive and to dribble the ball up along the field instead of passing the ball to move the opposition when it is not necessary.




[In this sequence, Ederson has the possession, and he is placed along the back line (Walker, Stones and Laporte are the other 3) and Fernandinho can receive and exploit the space as the opposition do not press high up the field and do not close any passing lane].



[When Manchester City plays out standing higher up in the field and there is the chance to play forward quickly, Fernandinho is very good at recognizing the situation of play and his skills to speed up the rhythm of possession phase is decisive for City to create dangers to the opposition in the final third]. This will be another issue for City during 2019/2020 season, as Rodri doesn't play with the same pace and he prefers short passing combinations].





At the end of the season Manchester City won the first Pep Guardiola's Premier League (100 points against 91 expected and scoring 106 goals) and League Cup, but they lost to Wigan in the 5<sup>th</sup> round of the Fa Cup and to Liverpool (5-1 total) in the UCL quarter final. Anyway, during that season City broke many records: most wins (32), most points ever (100), most goals in 1 season (106), biggest margin title (19) and most away wins (16).

- **2018/2019**

During 2018 summer, only Riyad Mahrez came into the squad from Leicester (£ 60 mln.) and Yaya Tourè left the club together with some other bench's players. Fernandinho sometimes started as center back and he was used to take the position as midfielder to support Gundogan, who became one of the most crucial players as play-maker, during possession phases, or De Bruyne.



[In this example Walker recovers the possession along the right flank, Fernandinho and Laporte are the center backs and Delph is the left fullback. David Silva and Kevin De Bruyne are the center midfielders in front of the back 4. Sanè along the right flank is the inverted winger, a tactical solution that will be recurrent during the whole season].



[Following the flow of the move, David Silva pushes high the field along the left and Fernandinho does the same, replacing his position to support De Bruyne. Walker take place as inverted fullback on the right to save the center].

The main tactical change didn't regard the system of play, but players' positioning and furthermore the inverted wingers sideward the center forward and Zinchenko appearances in the starting XI. Sterling often acts as left winger (right footed), he created space for Zinchenko to push up the field along the flank and Sterling used to run inside beside Aguero as second striker.



[In this example, Sterling shifts across toward the center and he receives from Laporte; at the same time, his movement opens up the space along the flank for Zinchenko to run through and to support his dribbling action].





Walker didn't act only as inverted fullback but he also supported the move as 3<sup>rd</sup> man, underlapping or overlapping to receive after passing combinations between the left footed teammate on the right. Bernardo Silva and Riyad Mahrez were alternated as right wingers, also moving toward the center striker to allow Walker, the right fullback, to push up along the right flank.



[In this first example, Mahrez shifts across from the right flank and he receives from Bernardo Silva; Walker who is supporting the move along the half space runs off the ball in between the defensive line and he receives from the inverted right winger].




[In this second sequence, Mahrez passes inside to Bernardo Silva, and he moves toward the left advanced midfielder; Walker overlaps and he receives in behind the opposition defensive line].

At the end of the season, apart from the titles (2<sup>nd</sup> Premier League in a row with 98 points against 91 expected, Fa Cup, League Cup and Charity Shield), Pep Guardiola had improved many of his players, taking them at the best performances of their careers.

Here are some examples:





Looking at the heat map of this match, it is clear how Manchester City definitely turn to a more direct style of play along the flanks to finish, after the usual patterns of play to build up; the main difference was along the left flank; when Mendy was in the field, the patterns of play were more direct along that flank, and Fernandinho supported the actions.

On the other side, the flow of play along the right flank was made of shorter passing combinations among Stones, Walker and Silva, to arrive to Mahrez as target player of the possession phases.

## 2019/2020: a season with tactical issues that still can be a successful season.

Despite City is still second in the league, the points per game average is decisively decreased (2017/2018 > 2,63 / 2018/2019 > 2,58 / 2019/2020 > 2,04 vs Liverpool 2,83). Why?


At the end of last season, Kompany said goodbye, and Sanè got a cruciate hamstring injured at the beginning of this current season; after 5 league matches, also Laporte got injured. As 2 center backs were missing just after few games, the center couple had to be reinvented; Otamendi came in the list definitively with Fernandinho beside him.



Rodri, the new center midfielder, who was signed last summer became the focus of the team in front of the back 4. Mendy, who has played as many games as in 2 years, and Walker, are the fullbacks. Due to Sanè injury, the inverted wingers beside Aguero returned into Guardiola's tactical mind.

Fernandinho hasn't the same abilities as Laporte has in building out from the back, and he suffers the opponent's pressure on his right foot to send him toward the left foot, which is not as good as Laporte's one; the former holding midfielder can't dribble the ball out as the injured teammate and


Fernandinho plays deeper and less passes are driven from the center back to the middle third teammates;



Rodri is not skilled enough to cover properly as Fernandinho did during the previous season.




On the other hand, when the ball is in the middle third, Rodri is very good at overcoming the opposition's pressure and drive the ball up in the field with 1 touch play and combination; he has a better average of passes than Fernandinho in 2018/2019 season:




The issues about possession are the progressive passes, as Fernandinho is still better than Rodri playing as center back (366 – av. 13,47 vs 281 – av. 10,05); Rodri is much better technically, but the front three and the advanced midfielder receives less passes due to the short passing style of play of the Spaniard.

The data are confirmed by the passes average to the final third and to the opposition's box:

<b>Fernandinho 2018/2019</b>	13,09 passes to final third	80,7% acc.
	3,2 passes to opp. penalty area	59,7% acc.
<b>Rodri Hernandez 2019/2020</b>	12,33 passes to final third	87,8% acc.
	1,25 to opp. penalty area	55% acc.



De Bruyne is taking part to the building up phase more than ever to support Rodri, as Mendy and Cancelo are classic fullbacks and they are not use to run inside the field; this way, one of the advanced midfielder is missing behind the front 3 and moreover, one of the best players in moving in behind the opposition defensive line is playing far away from the opposition's goal.



In this sequence, as De Bruyne is forced to drop back to support Rodri in the middle third...



...The winger (or a center forward) is also forced to shift across or drop back to cover the space left free by Kevin De Bruyne; this way, a striker to finish or a the width that a winger usually provides are missing.

<b>De Bruyne 2018/2019</b>	17,9 Forward passes	71% acc.
	7,99 passes to final third	71,9% acc.
	8,55 passes to opp. penalty area	97,9% acc.
<b>De Bruyne 2019/2020</b>	16,11 forward passes	70,1% acc.
	8,55 passes to final third	73,1% acc.
	7,65 to opp. penalty area	51,6% acc.

Despite being yet a high quality player yet, Kevin De Bruyne seems to be less efficient than last season.



David Silva has become a No.10 rather than one of the attacking midfielders, but he has less solutions, as De Bruyne can't act as close to him as the last season.



[De Bruyne and Rodri are acting as center midfielders and David Silva is standing in between the lines; as one of the attacking midfielder position is not covered near the ball, the ball carrier is closed down the wing by 2 opponents and Silva can't receive].



[In this second sequence, Silva receives between 2 opponents, with his back the goal, but he doesn't have any easy passing option to continue the move].

The same issue can be found when De Bruyne can play higher up in the field in his natural position and Bernardo Silva or Gundogan support Rodri; there aren't any easy passing options near him.



[De Bruyne stands higher in the field and Bernardo Silva and Rodri are the center midfielders; the ball carrier hasn't any easy passing option and he can only play forward to De Bruyne, who receives with his back to the goal].



[De Bruyne receives in between 3 opponents and he can give continuity to the attacking move]. The same situation was recurrent, when the advanced midfielder moved off the ball to receive from a teammate.



[Gabriel Jesus, the center forward receives while dropping back and he lays the ball back to De Bruyne, who is forced to receive under pressure].



[As the second attacking midfielder position is not covered when De Bruyne receives, and Sterling is then forced to drop back to try to support the possession phase. The ball is lost due to the numerical advantage of the opponents and due to the lack of easy passing options (2 v 1 and 4 v 1).

As the wingers don't provide width, the midfielders or the fullbacks do it; but this way the wingers can't isolate the opposition's defenders in 1 v 1 duels.



[In this first example, Mahrez shifts across to open up the space for the De Bruyne to overlap, Sterling moves inside to support the Gabriel Jesus (the center forward), but both them are involved in potential 2 v 1 duels even before a pass or a cross pass].



[In this second sequence, Sterling has the possession close to the crossing lines of the 18 yds. box and Mendy, the left fullback overlaps providing width; but 3 defenders cover the spaces in front of them and Sterling is forced to pass backward to Rodri. Mahrez shifts across too from the right side, but he can't receive as all the passing path are closed].

In the end, the 1-3-2-5 (2-3) attacking shape of the 2018-2019 season with the winger providing width to the fullbacks high up along the flank; furthermore, the wingers occupy the half spaces, trying to score with their inverted feet, but the 1 v 1 duels are now harder to achieve and win due to the opposition defensive overloading of ball's area. Despite this difficult season in Premier League, as of today (13/07/2020) City could still win the Fa Cup, the League Cup and the Champions League; Guardiola could be able to be a winner even after a difficult season from tactical point of view.

## Summary

This book aims to help the reader to understand the evolution of the Klopp's Liverpool and Guardiola's Man City during their fights in Premier League and try to discover the reasons behind the success of the Citizens during 2017/2018 and 2018/2019 seasons and the Red's way to approach the Champions in the 2018/2019 and the big victory of this current season (2019/2020).

The book contains all the squads year by year, the main transfers season by season and the tactical analysis of the possession and attacking phases, highlighting the best players that made the fortune of both clubs.

This is the second time since Klopp and Guardiola started their careers that they are fighting in the same league after 2 seasons in Germany, when the German coach had already given his best with Bvb and could be able to beat the Catalan a couple of times.

During Premier League seasons, the Underdog, who is coaching a glorious team that wasn't winning the League since 1989 has been able to beat the Maestro in his field, improving the possession phase, the attacking efficacy and thinking about how to dominate the opponents.

Meanwhile, the World Top Coach was making City an home victories' machine, failing the European title of the UCL; while Pep was winning at home, Jürgen has been able to achieve 2 Champions League finals, losing the first one to Real Madrid (1-3), but winning the second one against Tottenham (2-0).

Despite the results, Liverpool has had a constant growing process from 2016 to 2020; City reach the peak of the top at home very fast, just in the second season, the team was able to do even better in the third season, winning all the domestic trophies, but Liverpool has just made their best EPL best season of his history. There aren't losers in this battle; both have reached the success.

What's in the book?

- Citations from their philosophical thoughts.
- What former and current players say about them.
- Jürgen Klopp's & Pep Guardiola's careers, historic landmark and trophies (2016-2020).
- Liverpool formations 2016 – 2020.
- Manchester City formations 2016 – 2020.
- Liverpool and Manchester City attacking stats comparison.
- Liverpool attacking tactical evolution (2016 – 2020).
- Manchester City attacking tactical evolution (2016 – 2020).