

THE ROLE OF THE

WIDE

MIDFIELDER

ATTACKING



by **LUCA BERTOLINI**

The Role of the Wide Midfielder (Attacking)

By

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
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Introduction: where do they play in the field?

Note: the following pictures have the aim to find the wide midfielders in the systems of play, but they don't aim to find a precise heat map of their actions; the way they play always concern the style of play, the passing networks, the phase and situations of play.

- **Wide midfielders in the 1-4-3-3**




They stand beside the holding midfielder or play-maker

- **Wide midfielders in the 1-4-4-2 (flat midfield shape - the classic or inverted wingers)**



They stand beside the respective box to box midfielders...

Wide midfielders in the 1-4-4-2 (diamond midfield shape)




...or they complete the third middle rhombus if the middle third sector is made of a deep-laying and a No.10' in the center.

- **Wide midfielders in the 1-4-2-3-1 (wide attackers)**



They usually stand beside the center attacking midfielder. They alternate their position up and down the field, assisting the center midfielders in the middle third, linking the possession sequences between the middle and the final thirds.


- **Wide midfielders in the 1-5-3-2 (1-3-5-2)**



They stand beside the holding midfielder, but they become more "all field players," as only one teammate patrols the flank.

Apart from all the classic ways of placing the wide midfielders, two attacking shapes demonstrate the variety of chances to act as wide midfielders. They both come from the positional play idea of soccer.

- **Wide midfielders in the 1-3-2-5 attacking shape (Pep Guardiola at Manchester City)**



The first one includes an inverted fullback, who tucks in the middle third, beside the holding midfielder, and the wide midfielders become No.8 and No.10 players simultaneously, acting under the striker/wingers line.

- **Wide midfielders in the 1-3-3-1-3 (Marcelo Bielsa at Leeds United)**



The second one includes the idea of constant rotations all around the field. All players but the goalkeeper can become wide midfielders, concerning their position in the field after rotations and combinations of play.

The wide midfielders in the field: where and how do they play?

The wide midfielders in the 1-4-3-3: Xavi Hernandez and Andres Iniesta at Barcelona with Guardiola as a coach.

I get the ball, pass the ball (Xavi) – Receive, pass, offer (Iniesta); their way of play could be summed up with these two statements. The 1-4-3-3 was the best system of play to carry out the possession style of the so-called "Tiki-Taka," with ball progression and overloads. Pressing, false nine, and positional play were the three main factors that shaped the tiki-taka in the field, and Xavi and Iniesta have been the wide midfielders who realized the third factor in the field. They have been the right players for the positional play realization, apart from their excellent technical and tactical skills from individual points of view.



Xavi was a great passer, Iniesta a great receiver in the space, putting himself in a proper position to receive the ball by moving, following the division in zones that the positional play requires; rotations, changing and finding spaces in the middle and final thirds were their ways of play; talking about them

as wide players means to overview two all fields players besides the holding midfielder, linking teammates and taking the move to the final stage.



When the holding midfielder stands higher up and behind the pressure lines, Xavi and Iniesta did the same.



Busquets stands behind the opposition's pressure line, and the left fullback Abidal has the possession; Xavi and Iniesta wait for the ball higher up, and they are all ready to play 3 v 2 against the opponents in the middle third if they received.




While Barcelona was building-up, their goal between the two first opposition's lines was to create a numerical advantage against the opposition midfielders, as Busquets, the holding midfielder, was used to drop back, creating 3 v 2 duels, and to make the field bigger and create more space in between the lines higher; that movement created space was fulfilled by the dropping back false 9 (Leo Messi).



Mascherano and Piquet play 1 v 1 duels against the opposition's center forwards, and Busquets stands behind the first opposition's defensive line; Xavi waits for the ball along the third building-up line with the right fullback Daniel Alves.

Xavi and Iniesta were the players who usually supported the false nine.

The aim of the false nine was to create a numerical advantage in the middle third...



(Messi invites the opposition holding midfielder to track him, and Barcelona creates a 3 v 2 duel in the third middle center.)


...and to create a gap inside the opposition's defensive shape along the last line.



(Xavi and Iniesta are closed to the defensive line, creating a defensive numerical advantage in a throw-in situation for the opposition.)




(Barcelona wins the ball back, and Xavi can control the ball.)




(Messi has dropped back as false nine in the middle third, and he can control, turn, and dribble the ball forward toward the opposition's defensive line.)

Both Xavi and Iniesta also used to play out wide, to support the fullbacks when they pushed up along the flanks, and the wide forwards tucked in as center strikers from their wide positions.




(Abidal, Xavi, and Iniesta create a 3 v 2 duel along the left flank, and Pedro has tucked in toward the opposition's box.)




(Xavi is acting as back support along the right flank, and Daniel Alves combines with him. David Villa has tucked in to create a space that Barcelona could potentially exploit.)

Both of them could play in between the lines, exploiting the pocket of space created by Leo Messi as false nine.



(Xavi stands alongside Busquets in the middle third, and Messi drops back to invite the holding midfielder out of position and create a space between the lines. Iniesta receives between the lines and faces the opposition's goal. Villa tucks in and creates space for Daniel Alves, and Pedro is touching the sideline to stretch the opposition's defensive line.)

This is a similar situation, with inverted roles.



(Iniesta stands alongside the holding midfielder, and Xavi receives behind the opposition's middle third line.)



(Xavi can face the opposition's goal, Messi invites the fullback out of position getting narrower in the center, Pedro and David Villa can face the opposition's center backs 1 v 1.)

The wide midfielders in the 1-4-4-2 (flat midfield shape - the classic wingers): Saul Niguez and Ferreira Carrasco (and Angel Correa) at Atletico Madrid

The essential elements of Diego Simeone's Atletico Madrid tactics have always been the center midfield's congestion with narrow defensive shapes and overload out wide when the team has the possession.

The possession phase often starts from the wide areas of the first third, as the team usually tend not to concede chances rather than aggressively pressing; the fullback, the winger, and one of the strikers or center midfielders usually pressed and created 3 v 1 or 3 v 2 duels down the wings.



After limiting the chances for a switch of side, and after a wrong pass or control of an opponent's player, the phase of aggressive pressure and possession's recovery started.




(The only solution for the opposition is to play a through pass that the center back can easily cover along the byline.)

The Atletico Madrid wingers have always been counter-attacking weapons; the style of play is vertical and direct. The narrow and low shape creates space for the forwards to use behind the defensive lines, and the wingers are often those that start the counter-attacking moves with long balls to the forwards and who support the developments of the moves.



(Saul Niguez wins the ball in the middle third, as the winger usually get closer to the center midfielders, and Carrasco can run off the ball, exploiting the space that the deep and narrow defensive shape has created inside the opposition's half.)



(Carrasco can dribble the ball forward along the flank and send a cross pass for Torres and Griezman, which are attacking the opposition's box.)

Wingers and strikers run forward off the ball, as a fullback or a center teammate have won the ball back.



(The right fullback wins the ball, and Carrasco runs out wide to be a passing option to play out from the first third.)




(He plays a long pass to switch the side and for the Torres to receive in the space that the deep defensive shape created.)

Counter-attacks usually take the opponent to save the goal space; the wingers can exploit the spaces beside the overload area. In this situation, the opponents create a strong area around the ball just out of the penalty area, but they leave available space along the half-spaces.



(Torres and Griezman combine in the center and create space out wide.)



(Saul Niguez receives a through pass from Griezman, and he headers an assist pass for Torres, who scores.)

The winger is also the ball's recovery players, as they press actively out wide, using the touchline as extra defenders, after making the midfield's sector narrow in the center.



(Saul Niguez tracks the opposition's ball carrier, covering the space along the flank that the fullback David Lopez has created by pushing up.)




(He recovers the space and counters the ball carrier in a 1 v 1 duel, forcing him to turn backward and toward the nearest center midfielder, who is retreating to double team him.)



(Saul Niguez then combines with the fullback to build the possession phase again out wide.)

They are also the first diagonal passing options if the fullbacks or the center midfielders win the ball back after 1 v 1 duels.



(Wingers and fullbacks shift across the field to maintain the lines narrow and compact; they create wide weak sides, but the strong sides around the ball usually take to recover the ball.)

Furthermore, to switch the side is always very hard for the opposition due to the condensed areas around the ball and the closure of passing lanes of the opposite fullbacks and wingers.



(Carrasco retreats to close the passing to the opposition's attacking left side first...



...and he takes advantage of the condensed area around the ball, double-teaming the ball carrier and starting the counter-attacking phase. Saul Niguez, who has shifted across, can receive in the space behind the opposition's counter-pressing line.)

The wide midfielders in the 1-4-4-2 (flat midfield shape - the inverted wingers); Arjen Robben and Frank Ribery at Bayern Munich during 2012/2013 treble season:

Jupp Heinkes shaped his team with a floating shape between the 1-4-4-2 and the 1-4-2-3-1, as Schweinsteiger and Martinez shaped the double pivot center middle third, and Frank Ribery and Arjen Robben acted as inverted wingers; the French along the right side and Robben along the right. Tony Kross's position was initially behind the center striker Mandzukic or Mueller, but he became an advanced regista, creating passing patterns with Ribery and Robben.

When the center midfielders had the ball at their feet, the wingers still off the ball touched the sidelines; apart from the formation's shape, they were the main danger for the opponents. This way, the center players could attack and dribble the center spaces.



(Ribery and Robben have invited the opposition's fullbacks out of the defensive line; the center back are isolated in 1 v 1 duels, and the center midfielders are late in retreating their positions.)



(Kross can receive the ball, dribble it higher toward the box, and shot on goal without real pressure.)
The wingers entered into action when the fullbacks gained possession, or a teammate along the pivots' lines could control the ball.



(Lahm is dribbling the ball along the flank, and Robben is touching the sideline, inviting the opposition's fullback marking action, and creating a gap between him and the center back.)



(Despite Robben can only dribble the ball backward, the opposition's fullback must track him, and Lahm can run forward to that space, inviting the winger deeper and creating space along the flank for Robben, who can control the possession.)


The double-pivot system also worked inside the final third, as they forced the opposition's defensive line to stand narrower in the center...



Mueller, Mandzukic, Martinez, and Schweinsteiger overload the center, inviting the opposition's defensive shape to stand compact; this way, Robben and Ribery can play free from markers.)

Furthermore, Bayern tends to create 1 v 1 duels out wide, exploiting its wingers' dribbling skills; once in possession, they attacked the third middle center, rather than crossing from the end line.

Ribery alternated passing pattern solutions with the strikers, wingers, or pivots.



(Ribery receives along the flank, Kross moves in behind off the ball and receives...



(...he plays a cross to the far post, and Mandzukic can shot and score.)

The French players were also used to try individual actions to look for a shot on goal or a cross pass from the by line.



(He receives from Mueller along the left flank, and he can dribble the ball forward, exploiting the space that the narrow positions of the strikers and the teammate forced the opposition to take.)



(Ribery plays a cross pass to the box, and Martinez can attack the goal and header the ball to score.)

Robben used to look for shooting chances through direct play or 1 v 1 duels tucking in toward his left foot.



(In this situation, he has tucked in to receive and long pass, and he plays 1 v 1 against the opposition's center back.)



(He can face the opposition's goalkeeper to try to score.)

Fullbacks continuously overlapped the wingers' movements to send cross passes toward the opposition's box, moreover when Mueller substituted the injured teammate Tony Kroos for a large part of that season...



(Lahm overlaps Robben along the right flank, Mueller and Lewandovski attack the goal together with Martize, dragging the defensive shape deeper inside the first third.)



(Lahm plays a cut back pass in the space that the striker forced the defense to create by attacking the goal...)



(...and the second center midfielder Schweinsteiger can meet the ball and shot on goal without pressure and facing the opposition's goal without pressure.)

The fullbacks' overlaps invited the opposition's wingers or fullbacks out of position and creating space for Robben and Ribery.



(Alaba overlaps along the left flank, and he invites the opposition's fullbacks out of position...



(...Ribery and Kross can combine between them and exploit the space between the center back and the fullback that Alaba has forced them to create by overlapping.)



(Kross can receive and score in behind the defensive line and scores in front of the opposition's goalkeeper.)

The stable Thomas Mueller's inclusion in the starting 11 created a crucial difference in players' positioning; Mandzukic started shifting out wide. Mueller acted as second forward, and Ribery drops inside as No.10 on the left. The real Bayern's 1-4-4-2 was born from Toni Kross injury, as Jupp Heinkes decided to turn to it from the 1-4-2-3-1.





Sometimes, Ribery and Robben got closer to combine and creating chances for the team.



(Ribery faces the opposition's right fullback 1 v 1, and Robben forces the center back and center midfielder to stand narrow in the center...)



(Ribery invites all the three opponents' pressure, and he plays a through pass for Robben, who receives in behind...)




(...Robben exploits the goalkeeper's wrong choice, who decides to move out of the goal wide, playing a cutback cross pass...)



(...and Mandzukic can score in the center of the 6 yds. box.)


In this second situation, they have tucked in to create 3 players attacking shape and Mueller.



(Ribery receives a long pass in the center, just out of the box, as a target forward...)



(...Robben moves in behind off the ball and receives a short side pass...)




(...and he can score in front of the goalkeeper, who tries a late move out of the line out of timing.)

The wide midfielders in the 1-4-4-2 (diamond midfield shape): Ivan Rakitic at Barcelona under Ernesto Valverde

Ernesto Valverde's Barcelona version was more balanced and defensively aware concerning Luis Enrique's 1-4-3-3 shape; his 1-4-4-2 placed Busquets and Paulinho in the double pivot center midfield sector. Ivan Rakitic used to tuck in from the right flank to create space for the fullback, Sergi Roberto, to push up; Iniesta used to do the same along with the left one in favor of Jordi Alba. Messi played all around the space behind Luis Suarez, the only real striker of the formation.



(The center back is dribbling the ball forward in the middle third, Rakitic tucks in from the right flank to create space for the fullback.)



(In this second situation, Iniesta has the ball, and Rakitic tucks in to support the distribution phase, creating space again for the fullback along the right flank.)



(Here again, Rakitic tucks in as second forward while the holding midfielder Busquets has the ball...)



(...he creates space for the fullback to receive the ball after a switch of the side...)



(...he combines with the second center midfielder Paulinho to maintain the possession along the strong side.)




(In this third situation, Rakitic tucks in from the flank to exploit the prior dropping back movement of Messi, acting as second wide forward. The right fullback can push up through the flank exploiting the created channel...)



(...and he can exploit the space in behind from Iniesta, receiving a cross pass, after a switch of side.)

The Croatian player also helped the creation of a three-men strikers' sector, when Paulinho and Iniesta acted as double pivot sector in the final third.



But when Paulinho moved higher up in the field, Rakitic became the second pivot behind Busquets.



(He drops back in between the center backs to build up, and Paulinho joins Iniesta behind the opposition's pressure lines in the middle third.)

The wide midfielders in the 1-4-2-3-1 (wide attackers): Cristiano Ronaldo and Mezut Ozil/Angel Di Maria at Real Madrid under Mourinho.



Ronaldo and Di Maria were the wide attackers of the 1-4-2-3-1 Real Madrid's formation, with Ozil as No.10...



...but the attacking phases were always very fluid (Ronaldo has received in the center, and he shifts out wide, dribbling the ball, and Higuain tucks in the center from the left at the same time.)

They both assist the center striker, standing behind him in the center when Higuain acted as target player...



...Or they both moved higher when the center striker received after a dropping back movement.



Ronaldo also acted as a striker when Real Madrid defended deeper inside the first third, and he used to receive and counter the defenders 1 v 1.



(He shifts wide from the center to receive from Di Maria along the attacking right flank, inviting the center back to track him...)



(...and he faces 1 v 1, the direct opponent inside the box.)

Mourinho always looked to create 1 v 1 duels out wide and numerical superiority in the center of the defensive shape; in this situation, Real Madrid shaped a backline of five against Barcelona's center forward, wingers, and left fullback. But he always left two wide players free from marking tasks as long as possible to ensure counter-attacking chances.




(Ronaldo and Di Maria act as wide midfielders beside Xavi Alonso, and Ozil has pushed higher to counter the second Barcelona's pivot.)

As Real Madrid won the ball back, one wide midfielder/attacker shifted wide to receive and launch the counter-attacking phase.



(Ronaldo receives from Higuain on the left, and Ozil shifts across from the right to act as a center forward.)



(Ronaldo keeps the possession, and he must distribute, as counter-attacking actions are impossible.)



(Di Maria stands as wide as possible along the opposite side to create space in the center for a midfielder to move forward off the ball.)



(Di Maria has the ball, and he tucks in from the right, the fullback pushes higher up along the flank, and the second midfielder can run in behind the opposition's midfielders line to receive, as the Xavi Alonso also shifts across to act as holding midfielder.)

Wide midfielders in the 1-5-3-2 (1-3-5-2): Nicolò Barella and Stefano Sensi at Internazionale Milan


They both are dynamic players besides the holding midfielder.



Brozovic, the holding midfielder, Sensi on the left and Barella on the right create three different lines of passing options. Barella is acting as a No.10 in this situation, Sensi passes back and Brozovic becomes a link player.




The left wingback Asamoah has the ball in this situation, Sensi supports the teammates behind the pressing opponents, and Barella provides balance out of the overload area.



The right center back Godin, the center forward Lukaku, the right wingback D'Ambrosio and Barella create a passing pattern on play along the right flank, and Sens becomes the second forward on the left beside Martinez.




Sensi and Brozovic combine near each other, and Barella acts as an advanced passing option behind the opposition's pressure line.




Lukaku drops back as target player and lays the ball back to Barella, who is the link player to open the side of play out wide on the right flank to D'Ambrosio.

They create overload out wide along the flanks with the fifths and a dropping off forward.




Barella, Lukaku and D'Ambrosio create a triangle passing shape alongside the right flank in the middle third...




...Barella plays out from the overload area, as Inter can't progress the move and he switches side to the left; at the same time, Sensi becomes second forward beside Martinez.

The opposite wide midfielder becomes an addition forward to assist the remaining center striker, also running into the box.



Sensi create a line of three strikers, and Barella stands in the center as balance player.

The opposite midfielder also shifts across the field to overload the ball's area.



Sensi acts a passing option on the left, in this situation, and Barella moves further up in the field from the right, and help to create a string side along the left side of the middle third.




Barella plays a long pass to the box for the forwards, and Sensi moves higher up in the field from the left, to support the attacking move...



...entering the opposition's box after a passing combination with the holding midfielder, who is supporting the attacking move. This way Sensi helps the creation of a four men attacking situation inside the opposition's box.

The wide midfielders in the 1-3-2-5 or 1-2-3-2-3 attacking shape (Pep Guardiola): David Silva and Kevin de Bruyne.

Guardiola used to ask them to cover many fields, both out wide and in the center, but the half-spaces were their preferred territory to play, staying high up in the field behind the striker and the wingers, exploiting the holding midfielder defensive position and the inverted fullbacks' runs toward the center. They were some of the biggest chances creators until David Silva played for Manchester City.



(David Silva acts inside the left half-space here, and De Bruyne acts as a balance player and back passing option.)




(De Bruyne supports the right winger Sterling moving along the right half space.)




(De Bruyne is moving through the left half-space to support the left wingback Mendy, and Silva stands behind along the right half-space.)

The idea behind the 2-3 formation was to create passing triangles to distribute the ball inside the final third and create chances to score.

This is the ideal attacking situation in Guardiola's mind; the center striker, two wingers out wide and the wide midfielders which become attacking players along the half-spaces.



De Bruyne also exploited his long passing range to open the play and to progress the move, dropping back to support the center midfielder



De Bruyne drops back beside Rodri to create an additional passing option behind the opposition's pressing line.

On the other hand, David Silva usually stand higher in the field, playing returning passes and combining short to find pockets of space, when De Bruyne took part in the building-up or possession phases.





De Bruyne receives beside Fernandinho in the middle third and David Silva stands along the opposition's defensive line ready to drop back and receive.

David Silva was tasked with the role of ball's holder, inviting the opposition's pressure, to open gaps and find the way to play through pass toward the goal.





Their different characteristics and skills have made the citizens' fortune, despite not being able to win the Champions League; the following table indicates their different roles as wide players in the 3 men midfield sector.

Data average from 2017/2018 to 2019/2020 season	Assists p.90'	Completed passes p.90'	Completed long passes p.90'	Crosses p.90'	Progressive passes p.90'
David Silva	0.4	70,3	4,8	0,14	7,13
Kevin De Bruyne	0.43	59,7	9,54	0,64	8,46



They both sat among the best chances creators, as the assists per 90' show.


Progressive passes confirm their tactical positions to allow the attacking move to progress.

The biggest differences can be found in the completed passes, where Silva leads with eleven passes more than the teammate, and in the completed long passes and crosses, which are Kevin De Bruyne best technical gestures he has shown through the seasons together with his shooting skills.

The wide midfielders in the 1-3-3-1-3 attacking shape: the Marcelo Bielsa's way.



1. Wide midfielders as passing option to play out from the back behind the opposition's pressure



2. The fullback becomes wide midfielder to receive a pass out wide from a dropping back teammate, who acts as link player.



- Wide midfielders create a second line of three players together with the holding midfielder on the center left side of the field to open a space along the right flank for the fullback.



- The right midfielder becomes holding midfielder by dropping back and receiving behind the first opposition's pressure line.



5. The left midfielder touches the sideline to receive and to allow the team to overcome three pressing opponents.



6. The wide midfielders create an horizontal numerical superiority along the half-line



7. The wide midfielders push higher up in the field to act as wingers



8. The right fullback becomes wide midfielder pushing high up in field along the right flank, and the left one and the right one create numerical superiority in the center, freeing space along the right flank.

Finding complete K.P.I. factors' set for a wide midfielder (attacking phase)

Following the analysis of the play situations included in the book, there are some crucial indicators to define a K.P.I. (Key Performance Analysis) of a wide midfielder. The following metrics are the fundamental and general ones to define a wide midfielder's performance, apart from the specific roles, positions, and tasks he may have in a style and system of play.

Passes	Goals
Successful passes	Assists
Received pass	Shot assists
Smart passes	Shots
Successful smart passes	Shots on target
Key passes	Head shots
Successful key passes	Dribbles
Long passes	Successful dribbles
Successful long passes	Attacking actions
Through passes	Successful attacking actions
Successful through passes	Touches in the box
Passes to final third	Penalties
Successful passes to the final third	Successful penalties
	Expected goals
	Expected assists
	Offensive duels made
	Offensive duels won

Furthermore, there is a crucial division that helps to identify the metrics to look for:

1. A wide midfielder in a 3 men sector.
2. A wide midfielder in a 4 or 5 men sector, which become wingers or wingbacks.

3 men sector:

- **Building-up phase:** passes, received passes, smart passes, long passes, dribbles.
- **Possession and consolidation phase:** passes, received passes, key and through passes, passes to the final third.
- **Finishing phase:** assists (more than shots or goals) concerning the expected assists. Offensive duels, when the player is moving inside the final third.

4/5 men sector (as wingers or wingbacks):

- **Building-up phase:** received passes, smart passes, long passes, dribbles.
- **Possession and consolidation phase:** dribbles, received passes, key and through passes, passes to the final third.
- **Finishing phase:** assists, shots, and goals concerning the expected ones, attacking actions (crosses into the box included), touches in the opposition's box. Look for an offensive duel along the flanks and throughout the final third.

Other specific kinds of metrics for wide midfielders that may concern deeper the style of play are the following ones:

- Touches in the defensive/offensive halves P.90
- Pass accuracy in the first/middle/final thirds P.90
- xGBuildup P.90: contribution of a player during possession phases, excluding the assists and shots on goal
- Chances created P.90
- xGC P.90: attacking contribution of a player. [Find all the possessions each player is involved in. Find all the shots within those possessions. Sum their xG (you might take the highest xG per possession, or you might treat the shots as dependent events, whatever floats your boat). Assign that sum to each player; however, involved they were.]
- Total shots P.90
- Shot accuracy P.90
- Shots in the box P.90
- Non-penalty goal conversion rate %

Summary

This book aims to make the role of a wide midfielder when his team has possession. It wants to analyze a wide midfielder from positional and heat map points of view rather than from a static involvement in a play system, showing case studies that can be as comprehensive as possible.

These are the points which build the book:

- Where do they play in the field?

Wide midfielders in the 1-4-3-3, 1-4-4-2 (diamond midfield shape), 1-4-2-3-1 (wide attackers), 1-5-3-2 (1-3-5-2), 1-3-2-5 attacking shape (Pep Guardiola at Manchester City), and in the 1-3-3-1-3 (Marcelo Bielsa at Leeds United).

- Where and how do they play? The case studies:

Xavi Hernandez, and Andres Iniesta at Barcelona with Guardiola as a coach, Saul Niguez and Ferreira Carrasco (and Angel Correa) at Atletico Madrid, Arjen Robben and Frank Ribery at Bayern Munich during 2012/2013 treble season, Ivan Rakitic at Barcelona under Ernesto Valverde, Cristiano Ronaldo and Mezut Ozil/Angel Di Maria at Real Madrid under Mourinho, David Silva and Kevin de Bruyne, and the Marcelo Bielsa's way.

To complete the book, we try to find out the K.P.I. factors' set for a wide midfielder (attacking phase) in a 3 men sector or 4 and 5 men sectors (as wingers or wingbacks). Defining a wide midfielder is very hard, as soccer has become a liquid organization game; the intensity of play is continuously increasing, and static roles and their analysis can't explain player tasks in the middle third.

The best solution was to look at examples and case studies to give an idea of what a modern wide midfielder can be. I hope I was able to do it.